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I. INTRODUCTION
Amended Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
adopted in 1966 to make class actions more available, judicially effi-
cient, and binding.1 Class actions have made even small claims eco-
nomically viable. Constitutional challenges to statutes or
governmental practices, school integration, prisoners' rights, employ-
ment discrimination, antitrust claims, securities fraud, patent in-
fringement, franchise disputes, consumers' claims, and product
liability, as well as mass tort and breach of contract claims, all have
been clearly established as being subject to class processes. 2 The pro-
ponents of amended Rule 23 contemplated the device would provide
an additional method of enforcing consumer protection, antitrust, and
in particular, civil rights laws. However, in the rapid growth and
widespread use of the class device under the amended rule, procedural
fairness and due process rights of absent class members have been
reduced or lost.
Historically, absent members of the class were protected by the fol-
lowing legal principles: (1) adequacy of representation, and (2) notice
to class members giving opportunity to appear or opt out. Adequacy of
representation is comprised of four components: identity of claims,
absence of conflict of interest, competency of the named representa-
tive, and qualified class counsel. Notice to class members, giving them
an opportunity to appear or opt out, provided additional protection for
the absent members of the class.3 If an absent member chose to ap-
pear in the action, adequacy of representation became insignificant
since the class member had individually participated. Adequacy of
representation became irrelevant to class members who elected to opt
out because the judgment was not binding as to them, and their
claims were unaffected. Finally, the class members who, after notice,
failed to appear or opt out were deemed to have consented impliedly to
the representation as described in the notice; hence, adequacy of rep-
1. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966).
2. See Howard M. Downs, Federal Class Actions: Due Process by Adequacy of Repre-
sentation, Identity of Claims, and the Impact of General Telephone v. Falcon, 54
OHIO ST. L.J. 607 (1993).
3. Historically, notice with opportunity to appear or opt out was not required if ade-
quacy of representation was satisfied.
[Vol. 73:646
FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS
resentation was satisfied.4 Except for the identity of claims require-
ment, in practice these safeguards have been weakened substantially
under the amended Rule 23.
Identity of claims requires that the named representative present
the same claims as the class, based on the reasoning that the self-
interest of the representative serves as motivation to litigate, to prove
facts, and to negotiate a settlement fair to the entire class. In addi-
tion, there must be an absence of conflict between the interests and
remedies of the representative or counsel and the interests and reme-
dies of the class. Finally, the named representative and counsel must
be competent to present the issues. If these four components are sat-
isfied, class judgments, including settlement judgments, are binding
and entitled to full faith and credit.
The identity of claims requirement for adequacy of representation
was theoretically strengthened by General Telephone Co. v. Falcon,5
which demands a rigorous examination of the claims and issues by the
court.6 The 700 cases examined in a recent study by the author estab-
lish that the representative must assert the same claims and issues as
the class. 7 Furthermore, the cases that have followed General Tele-
phone continue to require identity of claims,8 with few exceptions.9
The absence of a conflicts of interest requirement tends to obscure
and confuse the analysis of competing interests and ultimately pro-
vides limited protection for the class.lO Obvious factors outside the
class structure such as preferences to representatives that may affect
identity of claims are ignored," and differences as to remedies sought
and intra-class dissent are overlooked as being not relevant to the
very subject matter of the litigation.12 Furthermore, major conflicts
between class counsel and the class are not covered within the scope of
this doctrine.13
4. In this situation, the notice must be sufficient, and the named representative and
counsel must nevertheless proceed competently in the presentation of the case
and avoid forbidden conflicts of interest.
5. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
6. Id.
7. See Downs, supra note 2.
8. Retired Chicago Police Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 597 (7th Cir. 1993);
Washington v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 959 F.2d 1566, 1569-70 (11th
Cir. 1992); Tucker v. Union Underwear Co., 144 F.R.D. 325, 328-39 (W.D. Ky.
1992); Bishop v. New York City Dep't of Hous. Preservation and Dev., 141 F.R.D.
229, 236-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
9. Johns v. DeLeonardis, 145 F.R.D. 480,483 (N.D. Ill. 1992); CV Reit, Inc., v. Levy,
144 F.R.D. 690, 696 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Lerch v. Citizens First BanCorp, 144 F.R.D.
247, 251 (D.N.J. 1992); Trief v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 144 F.R.D. 193, 200
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Revco Sec. Litig., 142 F.R.D. 659, 666 (N.D. Ohio 1992).
10. See discussion infra Part II.
11. See discussion infra subsections II.B.2. and II.B.3.
12. See discussion infra subsection H.B.4.
13. See discussion infra section H.C.
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Adequacy of representation has been further abrogated by the
steadily diminishing role of the class representative. Notwithstanding
General Telephone, class representatives are largely ignored by class
counsel and the court. Class counsel is not required to consult with
the representative as to class proceedings, and the representative has
no right to receive information, to participate in key decisions such as
settlement and appeal, and to discharge counsel. Should the repre-
sentative object, his view is invariably overruled by judges bent on
settlement. Thus, representation by named parties provides little or
no check on the increasing domination by class attorneys.14
Class counsel, unrestrained by the codes of professional responsi-
bility or monitoring by representatives, have a greatly enhanced role
in these lawsuits, which they initiate, finance, and for the most part
control. Although class counsel have major conflicts with the class
with respect to attorneys' fees, settlement, and fee sharing, judicial
scrutiny of such conflicts is minimal.15
The alternative and supplemental protection of notice giving op-
portunity to appear or opt out has also been reduced by the amorphous
categories of the amended rule. In certain categories of class ac-
tions-the so-called "mandatory" (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes-the histori-
cal protection of notice to class members giving them an opportunity
to appear or opt out is not required, although the court has discretion
to grant notice rights in such cases. Increasingly, courts are employ-
ing these mandatory categories, which simplify proceedings because
notice is not required; however, mandatory categorization may result
in substantial abuse to class members.
Categorization games have seriously jeopardized notice, appear-
ance, and opt-out rights and have introduced irrational distinctions,
which are distracting and confusing. Previously, any action that
sought damages was classified as a (b)(3) class, which requires notice
giving class members an opportunity to appear or opt out. Today,
there is authority to the effect that any action which combines dam-
ages with injunctive relief ought to be a mandatory class action.16
Even if notice is given, its content is often deficient and misleading.17
These concerns have not been resolved by judicial supervision be-
cause court approval is often procured with minimal review. Sweep-
ing due process issues under the carpet of settlement proceedings is
more aptly characterized as cheerleading than judicial inquiry. In as-
14. See discussion infra Part III.
15. See discussion infra section IV.D.
16. Mandatory classes based on a "limited fund" theory for category (b)(1)(B), or an
"incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class" theory for
category (b)(1)(A) are being certified more frequently. See discussion infra Part
V.
17. See discussion infra section V.E.
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certaining the level of judicial scrutiny, the author examined the
available files of all class actions completed in the Northern District of
California from 1985 to 1993.18 This study reveals extensive domina-
tion by class counsel and judicial laxity in overviewing crucial deci-
sions of adequacy of representation, notice, certification, and
settlement.
Settlement processes in particular do not adequately provide pro-
tection for the rights of absent class members.19 In addition, once the
settlement judgment has been approved by the trial court, the abuse
of discretion standard of review and the rules forbidding interlocutory
review make overturning such approval extremely difficult.20
Notwithstanding inadequate settlement notice, a collateral attack
based on denial of due process is also unlikely to succeed in settlement
situations. 2 1 The Northern California study supports the need for
substantial reform of amended Rule 23. Specific suggestions for such
reform are given throughout this Article.
II. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Courts routinely proclaim that to have adequacy of representation,
there must be an absence of any conflicts of interest. This standard is
not only obscure and confusing to apply but ultimately provides lim-
ited protection for class members. In reality, every class action in-
volves numerous conflicts of interest which must be identified,
analyzed, and evaluated prior to class certification and during the
course of litigation, as well as throughout any settlement proceedings.
18. See infra appendix A.
19. See discussion infra section VI.C. Absent class members are frequently affected
by any number of the following problems related to settlement: (1) Pre-certifica-
tion settlements, or settlements which are combined with certification proceed-
ings, raise special problems of unauthorized and unsupervised negotiations. (2)
Courts fail to require a showing or fail to determine the adequacy of representa-
tion, despite the "rigorous analyses" mandated by General Telephone. (3) In most
actions, a record on the merits is unavailable. (4) The court does not participate
in or demand information concerning settlement negotiations. (5) The named
representatives are ignored. (6) Preferences to representatives and conflicts as to
remedies remain undisclosed. (7) Detailed information concerning attorneys' fees
and fee sharing agreements is not required, notwithstanding the inherent con-
flicts of interest and susceptibility to padded fees and costs. (8) Notices for settle-
ment hearing are defective in failing to describe the facts of adequacy of
representation or even to reveal that adequacy is an issue in settlement. Notices
also do not disclose objections by the representatives. (9) Objections are fre-
quently overruled without reasoned findings at the settlement hearing. (10) On-
erous burdens are placed on objectors who are denied the very discovery and
inquiry by which they could have met such burdens.
20. See discussion infra Part VII.
21. See discussion infra Part VIII.
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The identity of claims requirement,22 independent of conflict of in-
terest considerations, provides that the class representatives have es-
sentially the same claims as the class, thereby ensuring that their
motivation and judgment concerning their own self-interests will in-
ure to the benefit of the entire class. The named representative func-
tions as a fiduciary to the class, with the duty to protect the absent
class members in key decisions throughout the course of the lawsuit.23
The legal standard for evaluating adequacy of representation with
respect to conflicts of interest is clear: if the alleged conflict would
interfere with vigorous prosecution of class claims, representation will
be denied. Outcomes vary, however, depending on the factual circum-
stances of each class action.24
A. Factors Outside the Class Structure Which May Interfere
with Representation
1. The Representative's Relationship with the Class Opponent
A conflict of interest obviously exists where class counsel or the
named representative acts in collusion with the class opponents.25
Representation may also be denied if class counsel has represented
the class opponent in other actions.26 Furthermore, a plaintiff who
22. Conflicts of interest concepts differ from the identity of claims requirement,
under which the claims of the class must be fairly encompassed within the claims
of the representative. Hence, the representative of a broadly defined class who
includes overreaching claims with his individual claims may not have any conflict
of interest yet lack identity of claims. The fact that the representative fails to
prove all the class claims does not establish a fatal conflict of interest, but the
litigation may lack the requisite identity of claims. Regardless of the good faith
of class representative and counsel in vigorously pursuing all class claims, iden-
tity of claims may still not be satisfied.
Although identity of claims lessens the likelihood of conflict of interest from
outside sources and enhances the prospect of vigorous prosecution, in that the
representative's self-interest in litigating his own claim reduces the risk that
class claims may not be fairly presented, the possibility of a conflict of interest in
the presentation of claims is not necessarily eliminated by satisfying the identity
of claims requirement. Outside influences which may potentially lead to conflicts
are discussed infra section H.A.
23. But see discussion infra Part HI (analyzing the diminished role of the
representative).
24. See cases cited in 3B JAmES W. MooRE & JoHN E. KENNEDY, MooRE's FEDERAL
PR~cTIcE $ 23.07[3] (2d ed. 1993) and 7A CHARLEs A- WRiGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1768, 1769.1 (2d ed. 1986).
25. See Guenther v. Pacific Telecom, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 341 (D. Or. 1987).
26. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 22 (3rd Cir. 1980); Guenther v.
Pacific Telecom, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 341 (D. Or. 1987); Richard H. Underwood, Legal
Ethics and Class Actions: Problems, Tactics and Judicial Responses, 71 Ky. L.J.
787 (1983).
[Vol. 73:646
FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS
may be liable as a defendant in the class action is precluded from act-
ing as class representative.27
2. Competing Interests Between the Representative and the Class
Ulterior motives of the class representative in pursuing the class
action suit may cause representation to be denied.28 For example, the
filing of other lawsuits by the class representative against the same
opposing party for purposes of harassment, revenge, or to gain com-
petitive advantage may create forbidden conflicts of interest.29 Possi-
ble competing interests which may lead to conflicts that are relevant
to adequacy of representation include historically competitive or hos-
tile relationships between the representative and members of the
class. An example of such a conflict would be if one Native American
27. See Pistoll v. Lynch, 96 F.R.D. 22 (D. Haw. 1982); Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62
F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
28. $ee Lyon v. Ariz., 80 F.R.D. 665 (D. Ariz. 1978)(dismissing class allegations
where wife of counsel for class would receive disproportionate benefit); DuPont v.
Wyly, 61 F.R.D. 615 (D. Del. 1973)(representative had incentive to "throw" the
suit in order to collect in separate action against defendant); Maynard, Merel &
Co. v. Carcioppolo, 51 F.R.D. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)(involving representatives who
sought rescission of merger to protect pre-merger benefits not applicable to the
class); Puharich v. Borders Elec. Co., 11 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 510
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 1968)(representative's primary interest in injunctive relief mo-
tivated by foreclosure of damage remedy to representative's portion of the class).
29. However, the existence of such conflicts will not defeat the class action per se,
notwithstanding the impact on adequacy of representation. See Pruitt v. Allied
Chem. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 100 (E.D. Va. 1980); Yearsley v. Scranton Hous. Auth.,
487 F. Supp. 784 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
In Pruitt, 29 plaintiffs who were engaged in various facets of the commercial
seafood industry sued Allied Chemical Corporation for discharging toxic waste
into the James River and Chesapeake Bay. Plaintiffs sought both injunctive re-
lief and damages and moved for certification on behalf of all residents of Virginia
and Maryland whose livelihood or income was derived from catching, buying,
selling, and processing seafood from the Chesapeake Bay or the James River.
Although the plaintiffs admitted that there might be inconsistent equitable reme-
dies sought by individual members of the class, the court without any substantial
analysis as to remedies found that adequacy of representation was satisfied upon
the creation of subclasses. Pruitt v. Allied Chem-Corp., 85 F.R.D. 100, 111-12
(E.D. Va. 1980).
In Yearsley, the plaintiff challenged the defendant's practice of giving priority
in filling vacancies to persons who have maintained city residence for one year or
more. Defining adequacy of representation as competent counsel plus absence of
proof of conflict of interest on the part of class representative, the court allowed
this lawsuit to proceed as a 23(b)(2) action in order to give res judicata effect.
Although the court conceded that there were a number of possible factual distinc-
tions among various plaintiff housing applicants, it did not consider the possible
range of remedies which might have been sought by different applicants among
the plaintiff class. Yearsley v. Scranton Hous. Auth., 487 F. Supp. 784, 787 (M.D.
Pa. 1979).
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tribe seeks to represent rival tribes in a single class action.30 Conflicts
of interest may also arise in defendant class actions. If the represen-
tative of a defendant class is in competition with the other class mem-
bers, representation that necessitates disclosure of trade secrets
would make the interests of the representative incompatible with
those of the class members because the representative may sacrifice
the legal interests of the class for the sake of protecting his own eco-
nomic position.3 1
B. Factors Within the Class Structure Which Create
Conflicts of Interest
1. The Representative Has a Separate, Personal Interest in the
Subject Matter of the Action
A representative may not use the class action device to resolve his
own individual claims if that would result in conflicting claims or pri-
orities in the subject matter,3 2 even though such claims would be ap-
propriate if the class were united against an outsider.33 For instance,
a representative who is serving her own self-interests by seeking de-
termination of her interests in mineral rights vis-a-vis the class is not
a proper class representative. 34 When the representative pursues her
personal interest at the expense of the class, conflicts arise because
the benefit to the representative could result in harm or reduction of
benefits to other class members.
2. Preferences Granted to Class Representatives
If preferences are given to the class representative, the interest of
the representative no longer coincides with that of the class. This sit-
uation may give rise to conflicts. To illustrate, a representative who is
granted $50,000 from the settlement fund as a bonus for services or
time expended will no longer be mirroring the class interest, since the
$50,000 is certain to influence the representative's judgment on settle-
ment. The representative and the class counsel who engineered the
preference then become collaborators on a process which may conflict
with the class interest.3 5 Procedural safeguards in class action settle-
30. Blake v. Arnett, 663 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1981). See also Pruitt v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 85 F.R.D. 100 (E.D. Va. 1980)(holding that class would be subdivided in
light of long-running conflict between Virginia and Maryland watermen).
31. Sperberg v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 61 F.R.D. 70 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
32. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 503 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.
1974)(finding conflict of interest where defendants' pricing system acted to favor
some members of the plaintiff class while overcharging other members).
33. See Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 414 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970).
34. Anderson v. Moorer, 372 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1967).
35. See discussion infra Part VI.
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ments, which include judicial review and settlement notice, are insuf-
ficient to protect absent class members against this type of conflict.36
3. Open and Obvious Dissent Within the Class
The classic conflict of interest within the class occurs when a sub-
group of the class opposes enforcement of a claim that the named rep-
resentative and other class members are seeking to enforce.37 Where
such a conflict is open and obvious, class certification will be denied for
inadequacy of representation. 3S However, parties may not challenge a
class action based on mere speculation as to class dissent.39 A positive
showing of an open and obvious conflict within the class is required to
defeat certification or to permit collateral attack for lack of due pro-
cess. 4 0 Dissent may be resolved by redefining the class or dividing the
class into subclasses, naming additional or different representatives,
limiting the issues, or giving notice with an opportunity to appear or
opt out.41
The glaring weakness of conflict of interest rules with respect to
class dissent is their failure to ensure that the existence of class dis-
sent is revealed to or evaluated by the court. Faced with increasingly
heavy caseloads, courts are often more concerned with the settling of
class actions which clears the calendar and are less inclined to engage
36. Indeed, the existence of such preference may not be disclosed at the time of the
settlement hearing and it simply is executed as part of the "plan of distribution"
of settlement funds. See infra appendix A.
37. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940)(permitting collateral attack on grounds
of inadequacy of representation and lack of due process where plaintiff sought to
enforce a racially restrictive covenant on behalf of all landowners, and certain
landowners within the targeted racial group opposed enforcement of the class
action). See also East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395
(1977)(denying certification based in part on the plaintiff's local union over-
whelmingly rejecting the class suit).
38. See Gilpen v. AFSCME, 875 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir.) (holding that class action op-
posed to the Union's agency fee not permitted where portion of the class only
sought refund of the excess fee), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 917 (1989).
39. See Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982) (certify-
ing class even with possibility of antagonism within class), cert. denied, 463 U.S.
1207 (1983).
40. Peterson v. Oklahoma City Hous. Auth., 545 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1976)(denying
certification where majority of tenants did not object to the security deposit regu-
lations the class sought to have set aside); Schy v. Susquehannar Corp., 419 F.2d
1112 (7th Cir.) (declining to certify class in which 80% of the members voted in
favor of the proposal to which plaintiff objected), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970);
WirGHT ET AL., supra note 24, § 1768, n.11.
41. Some authority suggests that dissenters may be ignored if they seek to block the
enforcement of legal rights. Such cases are often resolved by giving notice and
opt-out rights. See Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507 (9th Cir.
1978); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Larson, 554 F.2d 868 (8th Cir. 1977); Martino v.
McDonald's Sys., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 211 (N.D. Ill. 1979); HERBERT B. NEwBURG, NEw-
BURG ON CLAss AarloNs § 1120h (1st ed. 1977).
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in expensive and time-consuming searches for possible dissents which
could prolong or further complicate the lawsuit.42 Since courts have
no specific duty to uncover intra-class dissent,43 there is a strong ten-
dency to gloss over dissenting views in the haste to resolve class
suits.44 In many cases, dissenting interests remain undisclosed and
unexamined until the settlement hearing, at which time the dissent-
ers have little or no chance of overturning the result.45
In most jurisdictions, the trial court is not required to make find-
ings or a written record on the absence of conflicts. In addition, class
attorneys have no established duty to ascertain anticipated conflicts
or dissent or to bring them to the court's attention. Because such con-
flicts may defeat certification, reduce attorneys' fees, and complicate
settlement negotiations and approval, there is little motivation for
class counsel to inquire into possible matters of intra-class dissent.
Even the parties opposing the class may ignore intra-class dissent if
they anticipate a settlement judgment with a general release and res
judicata, because developing the facts of dissent and conflict could
thwart certification and settlement or encourage a collateral attack on
due process grounds.
4. Intra-Class Conflicts Which "Go to the Very Subject Matter of
the Litigation"
Even if the issue of intra-class dissent is raised before the court,
courts are not required to take it into consideration unless such dis-
sent goes to the "very subject matter of the litigation."46 This amor-
phous standard further diminishes protection for the class.
Courts will tolerate some degree of dissent within the class, partic-
ularly if the courts perceive any available means to mitigate the im-
pact of such dissent.4 7 Thus, the potential for intra-class conflicts in
42. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HIv. L. REv.
1281 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HAzv. L. REV. 1
(1978).
43. In a series of school desegregation cases involving dissenting Hispanic interests,
the courts sought neither the views of the representative nor the views of the
dissenters in considering issues of class certification and integration plans, and
denied subsequent motions filed by the Hispanic interests to intervene and form
subclasses. Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 912 (1981); Bradley v. Milliken, 620 F.2d 1141 (6th Cir. 1980); Cisneros
v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 560 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1075 (1978).
44. Under the present class action category structure of (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3), no-
tice in essence is discretionary with the court and has little chance of being over-
turned for abuse of discretion.
45. See infra discussion Part VI.
46. WIGHT, ET AL., supra note 24 § 1768, p. 327.
47. See Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 111 F.R.D. 49 (D.D.C. 1986)(involv-
ing motion for decertification of class based on alleged conflict resulting from
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later stages of litigation is considered insufficient to deny certification,
because such conflict is tangential to the subject matter of the litiga-
tion.48 For example, disputes as to eventual remedies are generally
ignored by the courts under this standard.49 This ambiguous and gen-
eralized approach might result in substantial injury to particular per-
sons and groups within the class, especially when the settlement plan
of distribution adopts only certain remedies.5 0 In the Northern Dis-
trict of California study inequality in the plan of distribution appeared
in thirty-five percent of the cases, and the plan of distribution was not
part of the settlement notice and approval hearing in forty-two per-
cent of the cases.5 1
C. Conflicts Between Class Counsel and the Class
Invariably direct conflicts arise between class counsel, the class,
and its representatives with respect to attorneys' fees, settlement, fee
sharing, and other issues. These conflicts, however, are permitted be-
cause the conduct of class counsel is ostensibly restrained by judicial
supervision, monitoring by class representatives, and is governed by
the codes of professional responsibility. In theory, the class represent-
members of class having received and parted with financial interests in the em-
ployee profit sharing plan in differing years denied; court held that such conflict
could be alleviated by having representative work with the class to show that the
stock at issue was devalued each year, rather than pitting different members of
the class against each other); Gordon v. Hunt, 98 F.R.D. 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)(in
class action alleging manipulation of silver market by three exchanges, intra-
class conflict due to differing purchase and sale dates by different class members
held not to create conflict which goes to the very subject matter of the litigation
because there were available means to minimize the potential for intra-class con-
flict by limiting class period).
48. See Social Serv. Union, Local 535 v. County of Santa Clara, 609 F.2d 944 (9th Cir.
1979)(involving unions which sought to challenge pay scales that allegedly dis-
criminated against female employees; court of appeals held that it was too early
to deny certification based on potential conflict within the union due to economic
impact of the suit on male union members).
49. See International Woodworkers v. Chesapeake Bay Plywood Corp., 659 F.2d 1259
(4th Cir. 1981)(holding that potential for conflicts that could arise at the remedy
stage not a sufficient reason for denying initial class certification); Meyer v. Mac-
Millan Publishing Co., 95 F.R.D. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)(holding that differing dam-
age theories asserted by the class, which would result in varying impacts on
different subgroups within the class, does not create a conflict which goes to the
very subject matter of the claim).
50. More commendable is a court which examines issue by issue to determine
whether there is a conflict. See Knop v. Johnson, 667 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. Mich.
1987)(denying in part motion for decertification for inadequacy of representation
in prisoner class action suit due to intra-class conflict after analysis of each issue
as to conflict, such as mail policy, winter clothing, eating facilities, library access,
and inmate employment), appeal dismissed, 841 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1988). See
also Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir 1987).
51. See infra appendix A.
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atives are intended to stand as a check on class counsel who may set-
tle claims too early or too cheaply, leave out claims, or give unjustified
preferences to limited class members.52
In a later section on the development of the role of class counsel,
these conflicts and the weakening of restraints on counsel will be ex-
plored in detail.53
III. THE DIMINISHED ROLE OF THE CLASS
REPRESENTATIVE
In a recent article, the author surveyed the history of class repre-
sentation and reviewed over seven hundred federal cases on this sub-
ject.5 4 As confirmed in General Telephone Co. v. Falcon,5 5 the named
representative is required to present predominantly the same claims
as those of the class.5 6 The representative's self-interest motivates
him to litigate vigorously to prove facts from his personal experience
which inure to the benefit of the class and to negotiate a settlement
which is fair to the entire class.
In addition to identity of claims, adequacy of representation con-
templates that the named representative is competent to present the
claims on behalf of the class. To function competently, the representa-
tive must have an understanding, or at least an awareness, of the is-
sues at stake.57 Personal qualities such as ethical behavior and sense
of responsibility are also considered in assessing the competency of
the representative.58 The financial capacity of the representative to
pay for costs, including cost of notice in federal and state court, is also
relevant.5 9
52. See discussion infra Part III.
53. See discussion infra Part IV.
54. Downs, supra note 2.
55. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
56. Id.
57. Darvin v. International Harvester Co., 610 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Efros v.
Nationwide Corp., 98 F.R.D. 703 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Massengill v. Board of Educ.,
88 F.R.D. 181, 186 (N.D. 11M. 1980); WIUGHT Er AL., supra note 24, § 1766;
Jonathon R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiff's Attorney's Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for
Reform, 58 U. CH. L. REv. 1, 92-93 (1991).
58. See Darms v. McCulloch Oil Corp., 720 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1983)(involving misap-
plication of funds by a representative); Green v. Carlson, 653 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir.)
(involving a history of filing repetitious and frivolous claims), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 944, (1981); Maddox & Starbuck, Ltd. v. British Airways, 97 F.R.D. 395
(S.D.N.Y. 1983)(criminal convictions); WmIGHT ET AL., supra note 24, § 1766.
59. Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd sub nom on other
grounds, Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980).
In those states which authorize counsel to advance costs, the financial stake of
the representative may be considered, but is not conclusive. Ingram v. Joe Con-
rad Chevrolet, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 129, 132 (E.D. Ky. 1981); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43
F.R.D. 472, 485 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). See also WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 24 § 1767.
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Notwithstanding the identity of claims and competency require-
ments for adequacy of representation, in practice, class representa-
tives serve little beyond a nominal function. They are largely ignored
by class counsel and the court and are not assured full participation in
the class action proceedings. This diminished role is partly attributa-
ble to changing codes of professional conduct as applied in class action
cases.
In ordinary non-class litigation the client is ultimately in charge of
the case.60 A dissatisfied client is free to discharge the attorney at any
time, and the rules of professional conduct demand that the attorney
accept such discharge. Class counsel, on the other hand, is appointed
by the court and owes a fiduciary duty to the entire class, not just to
the named plaintiffs; therefore, he cannot be discharged by the repre-
sentative. Whereas in non-class litigation an attorney has a legal
duty to abide by the client's decision on substantial issues such as set-
tlement and appeal, he need not do so in class actions. In fact, even
the attorney's duty to keep the client reasonably informed has limited
application in the class action setting.61 Class counsel generally do
not communicate with class representatives, thereby effectively re-
moving the representatives from the loop.62
The courts share with counsel the responsibility for reducing the
role of class representatives. Although in the 1970s some courts re-
quired a high level of representative participation,63 since then, the
In only a few jurisdictions, the named representative must pay for or at least
remain ultimately liable for all costs, including the cost of notice, but these rules
are seldom enforced even when applicable.
60. In the traditional lawsuit, counsel owes the following duties to the client [the
following abbreviations are used herein: MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
smnIrY (1983)("MC"); MODEL RuLEs OF PROFEssIONAL CoNDuCT (1994)("MR");
CAL. RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT (1992)("CRPC")]: (1) to keep the client
reasonably informed; MC 7-8, 9-2, MR 1.4, CRPC 3-500; (2) to abide by the cli-
enfs decision on substantial issues; MC 7-7, 7-8, MR 1.2; (3) to accept discharge
by the client; MCDR 2-110(B)(4), MR 1.16; (4) not to charge unreasonable fees;
MCDR 2-106(A)-(B), MR 1.5(a), CRPC 4200; (5) to act diligently; MCDR 6-
101(A)(3), MR 1.3, CRPC 3-110.
61. California Rules of Professional Conduct require that written settlement offers be
communicated to all the named representatives of the class. CAL. RuLEs OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 3-510 (1992).
62. See generally Jean W. Burns, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class Repre-
sentatives in Class Actions, 42 HASTNGs L.J. 165 (1990); John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-
thinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625 (1987).
63. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978)(find-
ing abuse of discretion by the trial court and overturning a settlement that had
been opposed by all the named plaintiffs and 70% of a subclass that was to receive
no back pay, stressing that class action concepts contemplated that named repre-
sentatives undertake a major role in key decisions), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115
(1979); Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896 (2nd Cir. 1972)(overturning settlement
because the representative opposed the settlement and had not been informed of
settlement negotiations).
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courts have tended to ignore or minimize the function of class repre-
sentatives. 64 Trial courts, under the abuse of discretion standard, are
entitled to rely on able counsel who negotiate settlements at arm's
length. The courts may also approve settlements regardless of opposi-
tion by a significant percentage of the class representatives or class, if
such settlements are determined by the trial court to be fair, ade-
quate, and reasonable. 65
It is absurd to require representation by named plaintiffs, only to
ignore them during relevant stages of the class action. Under the rea-
soning of the identity of claims and competency cases, representatives
should maintain their vital role in providing a check on class counsel
in areas of conflict between class counsel and the class. Meaningful
participation requires notice and consultation between the represen-
tative and class counsel, with the representative's views being commu-
nicated to the court. Only court rules will enforce such participation.
First, courts should require class counsel to inform and consult
with the named representatives on substantial issues, including nego-
tiations, settlement offers, and appeal. A written record of such con-
sultation should be made available to the court, which would also
provide the court with greater insight as to the fairness or reasonable-
ness of the settlement process. Second, the notice of settlement hear-
ing should disclose the existence and substance of any opposition to
the settlement, and the court should be specifically informed of the
dissent and stated reasons therefor. Third, the court should request,
in writing, the views of the named representatives on vital issues such
as settlement. Accepting class counsel's spin on these views should
not be sufficient for adequate representation. Lastly, if objections to
settlement are made by named representatives, the court should pre-
pare findings which specifically address these objections.
64. See Reed v. General Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1983)(affirming the
approval of settlement that was opposed by 23 of the 27 named representatives as
well as by 40% of the class).
65. Grant v. Bethlehem Steel, 823 F.2d 20, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1987). A few recent cases
have required notice to and participation by representatives and the class. See
Reynolds v. King, 790 F. Supp. 1101, 1109 (M.D. Ala. 1990)(rejecting settlement
for lack of class support, even though majority of plaintiffs did not file an objec-
tion, and reasoning that the court must look beyond the numbers to the total
reality of the circumstances presented and extrapolate some picture of the true
support for the proposed settlement decree). See also Wyatt v. Horsley, 793 F.
Supp. 1053, 1055-56 (M.D. Ala. 1991)(rejecting settlement because class support
was so small that attorney must be seen to have settled the lawsuit unilaterally
without class backing, therefore settlement was presumably not in the best inter-
ests of the class). Cf. Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 688 F.2d 615 (9th
Cir. 1982) (approving settlement over representative's opposition because repre-
sentative had been given opportunity to be heard and provided assistance of addi-
tional appointed counsel in opposing the settlement), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1217
(1983); Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828
(1982).
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IV. THE ENHANCED ROLE OF CLASS COUNSEL
A. Initiating the Lawsuit
As noted in the prior section, class counsel is restrained little by
the named representatives. Under the current practices of most
courts, class counsel is not even required to inform or consult with the
representatives, who remain virtually powerless as to the progress of
a suit which is supposed to be redressing their own legal claims as
well as those of the class. Additional power to class counsel flows from
the following developments.
Ethical restraints on attorneys initiating lawsuits have diminished
steadily over the last fifty years. In traditional litigation, the client
initiates the lawsuit, and the client seeks out the attorney, not vice
versa. An attorney who initiates contact with the client ("ambulance
chasing") is subject to discipline for violation of professional ethics, in-
cluding suspension or revocation of the license to practice law. In ex-
treme cases, the attorney can even face possible criminal felony
charges.
Today, a substantial portion of all litigation is attorney-initiated.
Clearly, the majority of class action litigation is initiated by attorneys.
Attorneys are now permitted to advertise and inform potential clients
of their rights, targeting those who have similar or common claims
from a single accident, product liability injuries, or overcharging by
financial institutions. Such communications have the effect of inform-
ing the public of their rights, but they also encourage the filing of addi-
tional claims.
Although various states have some lingering restraints on solicita-
tion, California has eliminated nearly all restraints. An attorney may
solicit by advertisement, letter, business card, or any other medium,
with the exception of oral in-person solicitations and solicitations to
those known to be represented by other counsel. Additional restraints
prohibit misrepresentations, deceptions, material omission of facts,
transmitting in a manner which involves coercion or duress, or mak-
ing guarantees, warranties, or predictions concerning the result of the
representation. Finally, solicitation is prohibited when the attorney
knows an individual is in such a physical, emotional, or mental state
that he cannot be expected to exercise reasonable judgment.66 In a
market dominated by advertising, these minimal prohibitions are
barely restrictive.6 7
66. For example, delivery of the solicitation at the scene of an accident or en route to
a hospital or emergency care center is prohibited. CAL. RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL
CoNDUcT Rule 1-400 (1992).
67. Recently, there were accusations in California that a group of crematoriums had
negligently commingled the ashes of a number of deceased individuals. Various
attorneys commenced radio advertising, informing the public as to this incident
1994]
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Where the amount of each claim is so small that filing or maintain-
ing individual lawsuits is pointless or impracticable, the class action
device becomes the only effective means of enforcing such rights. At-
torney initiation of class actions is seen as a way to enforce claims for
these small sums, which would not be viable as separate lawsuits.
Permitting solicitation and the initiation of lawsuits results in eco-
nomic benefit to the bar, which in turn led to the alteration of the
codes of professional conduct. Consequently, litigation costs in society
have vastly increased. A balancing of the benefits of greater enforce-
ment of rights against the additional economic and social costs may be
a subject of interest for future economic historians. What is clear,
however, is that current law allows the attorney to be the primary
initiator of litigation, particularly in class actions.
In both class actions and in ordinary litigation, an attorney has the
duty to act diligently. The failure to so proceed, particularly in class
actions, may cause any resulting judgment to be lacking in adequacy
of representation and accordingly void. However, because class ac-
tions proceed under judicial supervision, complaints against class at-
torneys are seldom heard by the state bar. Hence, the duty to act
diligently has little impact in terms of mitigating the increasing domi-
nance of the attorney in class actions.
The attorney also has the duty to avoid representing conflicting
claims. This duty, however, does not require the attorney to ascertain
intra-class dissent or conflicts. Such dissent, if discovered, tends to
lessen the chance of certification or may cause the appointment of ad-
ditional representatives and attorneys, which would result in reducing
the pie by splitting attorneys' fees. Because it is not in the attorneys'
financial interests to ascertain conflict and dissent, seldom will attor-
neys for the class voluntarily seek out and raise such issues before the
court. Various cases dealing with conflicts, including those cited in
the preceding Part, are normally raised by members of the class who
feel that their dissenting positions are not being represented by class
counsel.
Class attorneys have almost unlimited discretion with respect to
the remedies sought. This may lead to substantial discrepancies
within the class, yet these are generally not regarded as "conflicts."68
B. Financing the Lawsuit
In a traditional lawsuit, the client and attorney negotiate an agree-
ment with respect to attorneys' fees and costs. The generally accepted
and soliciting claims, thereby helping to create a cause of action for psychological
injury. See Claire Cooper, Court Deals With Hurt Feelings; Plaintiffs Allege Dese-
cration of Relatives' Bodies, Seek Damages, SACRAmNTO BEE, Sept. 11, 1991, at
A4.
68. See discussion supra subsection II.B.4.
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modes of payment include hourly fees (perhaps varied by different
hourly costs for different categories of attorneys, such as partners and
associates), fixed fees, and contingent fees. 6 9 Attorney fee contracts
may involve a combination of the above described methods, such as a
fixed-fee retainer plus a reduced hourly fee, with a smaller contingent
fee as a bonus in the event the client prevails in the lawsuit.
In civil litigation, the contingent fee is an invaluable tool for fi-
nancing lawsuits and is now accepted as an integral part of the Ameri-
can legal system. Such arrangements align the interests of the client
and the attorney who are both focused upon sustaining a maximum
recovery. Contingent fees also encourage monitoring by clients who
recognize that their participation in the litigation bears directly on
their ultimate financial reward.
Historically, the costs of litigation-such as filing fees, witness
fees, and other out-of-pocket expenses, as distinct from attorneys
fees-could not be contingent; the client had to assume ultimate re-
sponsibility for such charges. Many states, however, began to permit
attorneys to advance such fees, so long as the client assumed ultimate
responsibility for repaying those advances.7 0 Recent changes in the
codes of professional responsibility of California and other states au-
thorize attorneys to pay for costs and to be reimbursed from a success-
ful recovery. 7 ' With this important change, there is no
reimbursement to the attorney for such costs by the client in the event
the class action does not succeed.
In class actions, responsibility for costs varies according to each
state's code of professional responsibility.72 As noted above, some ju-
risdictions prohibit attorneys from advancing costs to finance class ac-
69. A contingent fee is a percentage of any recovery obtained by way of settlement or
trial. Some contingency contracts contain a scaled contingent fee, in which the
percentage differs depending upon the stage of the litigation. For example, a 20%
contingent fee upon filing, 25% upon beginning of discovery, 30% upon ending of
discovery, 35% in the event of trial, and 40% in the event of appeal are common
contingent fee percentages.
70. As a practical matter, the attorneys in these jurisdictions did not hold a client
liable for these fees if a case was unsuccessful.
71. CAL. RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 4-210(3) (1989).
72. Compare In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 93 F.R.D. 485, 490 (D. Md.
1982)(attorneys telling clients that they had practice of never seeking reimburse-
ment for costs found to be in violation of Code of Professional Responsibility;
court held that if client is not financially responsible, the attorney by virtue of the
financial advances is, in effect, a member of the class while also serving as class
counsel) and Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 379,
384 (E.D. Pa. 1974)(in class action filed to obtain interest on escrow accounts
mandated by various banks, attorneys had agreed with the named representa-
tives of the class that they would advance costs but that the representatives
would be required to reimburse them; court held that inability of the named
plaintiffs to reimburse costs will not defeat class action claim).
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tions,73 while others permit this practice so long as the class
representatives remain ultimately responsible for litigation ex-
penses.74 In contrast, California permits all costs and services to be
paid by the attorney on a contingent fee basis, 75 under the rationale
that it is essential to the interests of enforcement, redress, and deter-
rence that the attorney be permitted to advance and finance the litiga-
tion. To illustrate, there is little likelihood that a representative with
a $100 claim would have the resources and motivation to advance po-
tential costs of $100,000 in order to give notice to all class members.76
In general, class litigation in which a common fund is created is
analogous to contingent fee litigation in individual lawsuits-the at-
torney will not be paid unless the action yields some type of recovery.
If the successful action creates a common fund, the attorney will be
entitled to fees by reason of the contribution to that common fund.
Moreover, a class action which involves statutory fees will normally
result in payment to the attorney on an hourly fee basis.
A major difference in class action financing, however, is that there
is no agreement in connection with fees between the attorney and the
class representatives acting on behalf of the class. Attorneys' fees are
determined by the court in a hearing after the receipt of various peti-
tions by attorneys giving information concerning their services.
Although court approval of attorneys' fees is essential for the protec-
tion of class members, such approval is non-adversarial in over eighty
percent of class actions which conclude by way of settlement, and
gives rise to various conflicts between class counsel and the class.
C. Financial Conflicts Between Class Counsel and the Class
1. Attorneys' Fees
There is a direct conflict between class counsel and the class with
respect to the amount of attorneys' fees. Every dollar that the attor-
ney receives in fees from the common fund comes out of money that
73. Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1978)(court objected to
attorney financing of class actions, reasoning that impropriety would be inevita-
ble when attorney is confronted with potential for choosing a course of action
which may benefit himself financially versus that which may benefit the class
which he represents; judicial supervision and approval of any settlement held to
be insufficient safeguards against this type of conflict).
74. Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 379, 384 (E.D. Pa.
1974).
75. CAL. RULES OF PRoFrssSoNAL CoNDucT Rule 4-210 (1989).
76. See In re United Energy Corp. Solar Power Modules Tax Shelter Inv. Sec. Litig.,
122 F.R.D. 251, 257 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (California has no limitation upon advance-
ment of costs by attorneys on a contingent fee agreement, therefore there is no
impediment to attorney financing class action, especially given that in class ac-
tions there is need for substantially larger financing of the litigation, due to costs
of notice in addition to standard discovery and pleading expenditures.).
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would otherwise be disbursed to class members. To argue that the
attorney will fairly allocate attorneys' fees as against the class is to
argue against reality, against the vagaries of human nature, and
against widely held public impressions of the legal profession.77
2. The Settlement Conflict
In a class action, it is normally in the financial interest of class
counsel to settle the case at an early stage in common fund situations,
while it may be in the best interest of the class to continue the litiga-
tion. Court rulings awarding a percentage of recovery, such as a
"bench mark thirty percent" as attorney's fees, coupled with the attor-
ney's desire to maximize hourly return, means that the attorney will
be inclined to settle early.
To illustrate, if an attorney represents 10,000 members of a class
who each have $1,000 claims, the attorney well may be advised to set-
tle at an early stage for only $1,000,000. If at this stage the attorney
has expended only 100 hours, his anticipated recovery under the
benchmarks thirty percent of recovery would be $300,000, or $3,000
per hour (30% of $1,000,000 = $300,000 divided by 100 hours). If the
litigation continues, the attorney expends more and more hours with
less likelihood of getting the same return in terms of an hourly rate.
Moreover, having incurred additional expenses in advancing costs to
finance the litigation, the attorney has increased his out-of-pocket in-
vestment, and therefore risk, in the event the case proceeds to trial
and is unsuccessful. Thus, the attorney, both in terms of risk and
hourly return, will seek an early settlement even though the client
will receive only $700 on a claim of $10,000 ($1,000,000 settlement
less $300,000 attorneys fees and costs or $700,000 distributed to the
10,000 clients).
The client, on the other hand, has no such investment in costs and
expenses, and faces little or no risk in proceeding with the case to
trial. If class members believe their claim is really worth $10,000
each (or at least $8,000) it would be in their best interests to see the
case brought to trial where they might receive a higher recovery. An
$8,000,000 recovery after trial, even if as much as fifty percent of that
amount goes toward attorneys' fees, would still result in a greater net
return for the members of the class. This type of early settlement con-
77. This basic conflict is recognized in a number of decisions. See Prandini v. Na-
tional Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3rd Cir. 1977)(settlement agreement which
provided for payment of a specified sum to the class and another set sum to coun-
sel, where both sums had been negotiated simultaneously, held to involve inher-
ent conflict of interest and could not be upheld without independent evaluation);
Kraemer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1092 (3rd Cir.)(refusing to
allow attorney to be both class representative and class counsel; partner of attor-
ney also not permitted to act as class counsel), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
19941
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
flict should be, but seldom is, an integral part of the court's analysis in
determining the propriety of the settlement agreement which the
court must approve under Rule 23(e). 78
3. Fee Sharing
When a number of legal firms are in competition to be named as
class counsel and the prospective costs are substantial, prospective
class counsel may enter into an agreement to share the legal fees that
might be awarded by the court. These fee-sharing arrangements are
designed to eliminate competition among the prospective class counsel
and to maximize the ultimate attorneys' fees by preventing conflicts
which might reveal unsavory details of attorney activities such as
overbilling. Fee sharing ensures that everyone gets a piece of the pie,
and that the pie is larger.
Often fee-sharing arrangements among class counsel are not dis-
closed and are never known by the class or the court. In general, the
California Rules of Professional Conduct provide that fee-sharing ar-
rangements may occur only with the client's consent and that anyone
sharing in the fees may receive only a reasonable return for his or her
services. 79 California has modified even this requirement to authorize
any fee sharing so long as the total amount charged to the client is not
larger than it would have been without the fee-sharing arrangement.
This standard, however, is almost impossible to determine by the
court hearing the fee petitions in class action cases.80
The potential conflicts described above are deemed to be resolved
by a court hearing concerning approval of attorneys' fees and approval
of a settlement agreement.8 1 Yet this assumption is not justified,
given that in many instances, a court hearing on attorney fee petitions
never occurs. Where the action is settled and there are no objections
brought before the court, the courts in many of the over 700 cases ex-
amined in this study routinely have approved attorneys' fees without
meaningful examination or inquiry.
78. See discussion infra subsection VI.A.4.
79. CAL. RuLEs OF PROwESSioNAL CoNDucT Rule 2-200 (1989).
80. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 226 (2d Cir. 1987). In that
case, the fee-sharing agreement provided that those who advanced money for
costs were to receive three times the amount of that which they contributed. The
court did not forbid all fee-sharing arrangements but noted that such arrange-
ments may result in forbidden conflicts of interest between the attorneys and the
class that may not be discernible from the terms of the settlement. The court
placed a duty on class counsel to inform the class as well as the court of such fee-
sharing arrangements in sufficient time in advance of the fee and settlement ap-
proval, so that objections could be made and new counsel hired to advance those
objections.
81. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Share-
holder Litigation, 48 LAw & CoNTrrmp. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 26 (arguing
judicial review is an insignificant barrier to collusive settlements).
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D. Inadequacy of Judicial Review of Attorneys' Fees
1. The Lodestar Method
For a number of years until the early 1980s, courts followed the
lead of the Third Circuit's Lindy decisions in calculating attorneys'
fees on the "lodestar" basis.82 Courts would multiply the number of
hours spent by the attorneys' hourly rate to obtain a lodestar figure,
which is then enhanced by the use of a multiplier to reflect the quality
of the work and the contingent nature of the case. Courts came to
realize, as the prescient judge in Rosenfeld v. Black83 had observed:
The measurement of proper fees is not always the time spent. A lawyer may
at one extreme work doggedly to no end, or even mount a treadmill. Attend-
ance to minutiae sometimes enhances the billing. And one is mindful of the
apocryphal English solicitor who billed his client [for] "Thinking in bed, one
guinea."8 4
Over time, some courts became increasingly impatient with the
time-consuming analysis of billing records required of them under the
lodestar approach. The lodestar analysis was criticized as causing du-
plication of effort, expenditure of unwarranted hours to increase fees,
and waste of judicial resources by the detailed and time-consuming
calculations which the method required, as well as discouraging
timely settlements where attorneys have not yet accumulated suffi-
cient hours to obtain a large lodestar fee.85 The approach also re-
sulted in several weeks delay of attorneys' fee decisions, which in turn
delayed the distribution of the settlement fund to the class.8 6
Objections to the lodestar method were based on the implicit but
largely unarticulated premise that attorneys pad their hours and
otherwise engage in unethical activities to enhance their fees, and
that key decisions pertaining to settlement are affected by counsel
fees. In practice, faced with non-adversarial proceedings, courts be-
came more lax in the use of multipliers. Whereas multipliers of 1.5 to
2 were common in the in the 1970s, 87 by the late 1980s multipliers of 3
82. See Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 487
F.2d 161, 167-69 (3d Cir. 1973)("Lindy I"), vacated, 540 F.2d 102, 119-21 (3d Cir.
1976)(en banc)("Lindy II").
83. 56 F.R.D. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
84. Id. at 606 (citation omitted).
85. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 588 (3d Cir. 1984); In re
Union Carbide Consumer Prod. Business Sec. Litig., 724 F. Supp. 160, 166-69
(S.D.N.Y. 1989). See also Samuel R. Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees:
What Is 'Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 281, 286-87 (1977) (discussing
problems with lack of uniformity and other defects); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing
the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not
Working, 42 MD. L. Rnv. 215, 240-41 (1983)(documenting reasons for change
from a percentage formula to a time formula for attorneys' fees).
86. See In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
87. See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 84 F.R.D. 245 (N.D. Ill. 1979)(using
multipliers equivalent to lodestar 1.75 times); In re Master Key Antitrust Litig.,
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to 4.5 were frequently applied. 88 Translated, this means that an at-
torney who charges a customary hourly rate of $400 would receive
$1,600 per hour from the class fund at the expense of the non-appear-
ing class. Eventually, judicial frustration and dissatisfaction with the
lodestar formula's premium on time and random multipliers reached
its peak in the Third Circuit's chastisement of attorneys in In re Fine
Paper Antitrust Litigation.8 9
2. The Percentage-of-Recovery Standard
In 1990, the Ninth Circuit authorized a pure percentage of recov-
ery approach in common fund cases with this summary of the current
status of competing standards:
Recently, a debate has arisen over whether attorney's fees awards in com-
mon fund cases should be calculated on a "lodestar" or "percentage of the
fund" basis. Since at least the early 1970's, the tendency has been to award
such fees according to a lodestar approach. Recently, however, courts have
begun to reconsider this approach. The Supreme Court sparked this reconsid-
eration when it endorsed the percentage-of-the-fund approach for common
fund cases in a recent case. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16
(1984)(unlike in the civil rights area, "the calculation of attorney's fees under
the 'common fund doctrine'.. . is based on a percentage of the fund bestowed
on the class")....
Despite the recent ground swell of support for mandating a percentage-of-
the-fund approach in common fund cases, however, we require only that fee
awards in common fund cases be reasonable under the circumstances. Ac-
cordingly, either the lodestar or the percentage-of-the-fund approach "may,
depending upon the circumstances, have its place in determining what would
be reasonable compensation for creating a common fund."9 0
1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 61,887 (D. Conn. 1978)(two times to lead counsel,
1.75 times to co-lead counsel); Republic Nal Life Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 73 F.R.D.
658, 670-672 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)(using multiples up to two).
88. See In re Oak Indus. Sec. Litig., No. 830537-G(M), 1986 WL 28907 (S.D. Cal. July
1, 1986)(four times); Brewer v. Southern Union Co., 607 F. Supp. 1511, 1535 (D.
Colo. 1984)(3.0, 3.35 times); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 1983-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,628 (S.D. Tex. 1983)(four times to lead counsel); J.N. Fu-
tia Co. v. Phelps Dodge Indus., Inc., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,978 (S.D.N.Y.
1982)(three times multiplier used); Pacific Plumbing Supply Co. v. Crane Co.,
1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,473 (W.D. Wash. 1982)(court used multiplier of
three times); In re Cenco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 519 F. Supp. 322, 327 (N.D. Ill.
1981)(court used multiplier of four times); Municipal Auth. of Town of Blooms-
burg v. Pennsylvania, 527 F. Supp. 982, 993 (M.D. Pa. 1981)(court used multi-
plier of 4.5 times).
89. 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984)(efforts at the district and appellate levels to calculate
appropriate fees for competing applicants took longer than litigation of the com-
plex case-in-chief). See also Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, Court
Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 258 (1985)(condemning the Lindy lode-
star analysis as "cumbersome, enervating, and often surrealistic process of pre-
paring and evaluating fee petitions that now plagues the Bench and Bar").
90. See Florida v. Dunne, 915 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1990)(citations omitted)(quoting
Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 271 (9th Cir. 1989)).
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The percentage-of-recovery standard has been extensively applied
in the Northern District of California.91 Judge Patel, in In re Activi-
sion Securities Litigation,92 described the reasons for this approach:
In the future... the court will opt for the percentage approach in common
fund cases. This case demonstrates the reasons as discussed above. After
three years of litigation, substantial discovery and motion practice, and on the
eve of trial, a settlement was reached from which the attorneys will receive
32.8%, 22% of which was for attorneys' fees, the remainder being expenses. A
similar result could have been achieved much earlier in the litigation. With
early disposition there are fewer expenses to be deducted from the settlement
fund, thereby creating an incentive of receiving a greater percentage of the
fund in attorneys' fees. The integrity of the attorneys' fee application process
would be enhanced, and the class members would receive at least the same
benefits and receive them earlier.93
As shown by the study of Northern District class actions from 1985
through 1993,94 the percentage-of-recovery approach substantially
weakens the interests of the class. Early and cheap settlements are
encouraged because class counsel will receive a quick thirty percent of
the recovery for attorneys' fees. For the most part, the only content in
attorney fee petitions are "puff" statements prepared by the attorneys
seeking fees. No examination of reasonableness factors are under-
taken, and no evidence of attorneys' hours are submitted. In addition,
hours for paralegal support are customarily added to the thirty per-
cent as expenses. Objectors are provided no evidentiary mechanism to
oppose such fee requests. For class members receiving five cents on
the dollar in a quick settlement-as opposed to the amounts de-
manded in the complaint, presumably after Rule 11 mandated reason-
able inquiry-the attorney fee award is perceived as unfair,
particularly since the amounts could be as high as several thousand
dollars per hour.
If fairness to the class is considered, arguments supporting the
percentage-of-recovery standard, based on class counsel's tendency to
cheat and the court's inability to control attorney avarice without in-
curring extra time and expense, are actually arguments in favor of the
blended reasonable approach, discussed below. Courts routinely re-
view statutory hourly fees, at times with the assistance of a master
and without substantial complaint.
3. The Reasonable or Blended Approach
Many courts perceived flaws inherent in a strict time-based system
and developed an alternative set of criteria, which considered quality
of work, risk, difficulty of the case, and other relevant factors facing
91. See infra appendix A, chart D.
92. 723 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
93. Id. at 1379.
94. See infra appendix A, chart D.
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class action practitioners. In Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc.,95 the Fifth Circuit articulated twelve factors to be used in com-
mon fund attorney fee assessments, based on the Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility.96 This method of calculating awards was
subsequently adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Kerr v. Screen Extras
Guild, Inc.9 7 Although the blended reasonableness approach requires
judicial time, this standard, properly applied, will protect the class
against egregious attorney manipulation of fees.
Regardless of which standard is applied, the review of attorney fee
petitions is held in a non-adversarial proceeding, with the court hav-
ing only limited information. Rarely do members of the class or the
settling defendants who lack financial interest in the fund that they
have created come forward to provide insight on fee petitions.98 As
noted by Judge Patel in In re Activision Securities Litigation,99 the
court is abandoned by the adversary system at the point of application
for attorneys' fees, and left to the plaintiff's unilateral applications
and the judge's own good conscience. 00
In short, class counsel has vastly enhanced power with obvious
conflicts of interest, unbridled by judicial scrutiny or restraints.
Abuse of class interest in these situations is described below, together
95. 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).
96. See id. at 717-19. These factors include (1) time and labor required; (2) novelty
and difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the skill necessary to perform the
legal services properly; (4) preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to
acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or con-
tingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the
amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and
ability of the attorney; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and
length of professional relations with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
97. 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 591 (1976).
98. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 693-97 (N.D. Cal. 1990) In that case,
Judge Walker emphasized the inadequacy of court review of fee petitions. The
hourly fee approach in the common fund cases creates an incentive to run up
hours and/or to do too much work in relation to the stakes in the case. Since
there is generally little or no monitoring of attorneys' performance throughout
the case, it becomes almost physically impossible for the court to ascertain the
amount of padding involved in such petitions. The court suggested that class
actions should be handled on a contingent fee basis, with the attorneys bidding at
the onset of the case to obtain the right to class counsel by the lowest competitive
bid, subject to the court satisfying itself as to the quality of representation by the
competitive bidders. Such competitive bidding, particularly if the bidding set
contingent fees at different levels during different stages of the trial, would ap-
pear to be an effective way to deal with the deficiencies in the present system.
See also In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 813 F. Supp 633, 639 (N.D. Ill. 1993)(ap-
proving Judge Walker's approach of selecting class counsel with competitive bid-
ding; though it has not yet met the test of appellate approval).
99. 723 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
100. Id. at 1374.
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with recommendations for special class action masters or magistrate
judges.
V. CLASS ACTION CATEGORIES AND THE WEAKENING OF
NOTICE RIGHTS UNDER AMENDED RULE 23
Adequacy of representation is the sine qua non of class actions and
remains essential throughout the lawsuit, not just at the time of certi-
fication.1o1 Under class action law, if the requirement of adequate
representation-which encompasses identity of claims, issues, and
remedies-is satisfied, due process does not require notice giving class
members the opportunity to appear or opt out. 0 2
All due process rights are personal and may be waived or satisfied
by consent.10 3 The principles of waiver or consent assume that notice
fully informs the absent class member of the situation so that a con-
sidered choice is possible.104 Notice giving opportunity to appear or to
opt out fulfills fairness and due process in class actions in the follow-
ing manner:
1. If the absent class member appears and participates pursuant
to notice, the class member has had her day in court, and the case is
no longer a representative action as to the appearing party.
2. If the class member opts out, the class judgment is not binding
as to that member; consequently, there can be no due process
violation.
3. If the class member neither appears nor opts out, that member
may be deemed to have waived any objections and to have consented
101. See, e.g., Grigsby v. Northern Miss. Medical Ctr., Inc., 586 F.2d 457,461 (5th Cir.
1978); Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72 (5th Cir. 1973); Lewis v. Phillip Mor-
ris, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 345, 351-53 (E.D. Va. 1976).
102. Hundreds of cases have upheld the refusal to give notice in (b)(1) and (b)(2) cases,
based upon the assumption of adequate representation. See WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 24, § 1786. E.g., Navarro-Ayala v. Hernandez-Colon, 951 F.2d 1325,
1337 (1st Cir. 1991).
103. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812-13 (1985). See also Insur-
ance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703-04
(1982)(stating that personal jurisdiction may be intentionally waived because it
represents an individual right and that an individual may consent to personal
jurisdiction).
104. Many if not most class action notices are inadequate and/or misleading. Typi-
cally, notices do not describe atypical issues or problems in adequacy of represen-
tation. The notice may be further misleading by stating that adequacy of
representation has already been established by the court in a certification hear-
ing. For a class member to make the decision to waive rights or to consent to
representation, the notice should specifically describe the representative claims
and remedies, the class claims and remedies, and the differences therein, if any,
as well as the qualifications of the representative and counsel.
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to be bound by the representation on all class claims, remedies, and
issues, provided the notice is adequate. 05
During the certification process, the scope of class claims as com-
pared with the scope of the named representative's claims may be un-
clear.106 Presumably, a properly worded notice which clearly defines
the class and the representative claims may incite some response from
class members and thereby assist in clarifying the scope of class
claims, remedies, and issues. Such notice may lead to a better evalua-
tion of the representation. Responses to the notice may lead to a rede-
fining of the class, a limiting of the issues, or even decertification.
Conversely, the absence of any response following proper notice may
be evidence that the current level of representation is adequate.
In drafting amended Rule 23, the Advisory Committee created four
categories, based on uncertain generalities, that established a class
right to notice giving class members the opportunity to be heard or to
opt out.10 7 Rather than protect absent class members, these catego-
ries tend to detract from fairness and due process considerations be-
cause of the technical language upon which they turn. If a class action
is classified as a (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), or (b)(2) action, there is no class
right to notice giving an opportunity to appear or opt out, although
courts have the discretion to grant such rights.108 These actions have
been labelled as "mandatory class actions" in the sense that the par-
ties must remain in the action and are bound by the outcome under
the principle of res judicata. Recent trends broadening the mandatory
classification for class actions have further diminished notice rights
for class members.
A. The (b)(1)(A) Category
The (b)(1)(A) category is defined by the interests of the opponent to
the class. Rule 23(b)(1)(A) states that a suit may proceed as a class
action if the opponent faces incompatible standards of conduct from
the contentions of divergent parties. 0 9
105. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810-11 (1985).
106. Although this discussion links opportunity to appear and opportunity to opt out
under Rule 23(c)(2), the two concepts are separate. Due process may be satisfied
by waiver or consent based upon notice giving opportunity to be heard without
opt-out rights, or based upon notice giving opt-out rights without an opportunity
to be heard.
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
108. FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(c).
109. Section 23(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in
addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class would create a risk of
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The problem is that all class litigation, even litigation for damages,
has the potential to affect a defendant's standard of conduct. For in-
stance, a suit for nuisance damages may be won by some claimants
and lost by others, thereby creating "incompatible standards of con-
duct" for the defendant. Hence, damage actions, which are normally
construed as (b)(3) actions, may also fall within the language of
(b)(1)(A),11o and the court may deny notice giving opportunity toeap-
pear or to opt out.111 The confusion from such amorphous language
has resulted in inconsistent case law on what exactly constitutes a
(b)(1)(A) class action and games in which the category is manipulated
to avoid the time and expense of giving notice.112
In a (b)(1)(A) class action, the focused concern is on the party op-
posing the class, not on the protection of absent class members. In
order to effectively resolve all the claims without imposing conflicting
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to in-
dividual members of the class which would establish incompatible stan-
dards of conduct for the party opposing the class ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A.
110. The "incompatible conduct" language in (b)(1)(A) is similar to that in Rule 19,
which was amended in 1966. FED. R. CIV. P. 19. However, this phrase is only one
factor in determining indispensable or necessary parties under Rule 19. See gen-
erally Provident Tradesmen Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 109-11
(1968)(examination of the interests of the claimant, the interests of the absent
parties, and the social interest in light of "equity and good conscience" are addi-
tional considerations required for compulsory joinder under Rule 19.) In compar-
ison, these additional factors are ignored in the application of Rule 23, making
"incompatible standards of conduct" the sole basis for a binding mandatory class
action, regardless of other factors or competing interests. FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(1)(A).
111. See Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280, 283-84 (8th Cir. 1978); Robertson v. NBA,
556 F.2d 682, 684-85 (2d Cir. 1977).
This possible confusion has caused some courts to say that (b)(1)(A) does not
apply to damage actions. See, e.g., In re Bendectin Prod. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d
300, 305 (6th Cir. 1984); Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335,
1340 (9th Cir. 1976); WmauT ar AL., supra note 24, § 1773 n.4.
112. Compare In re Greenman Sec. Litig., 94 F.R.D. 273, 276-78 (S.D. Fla.
1982)(granting (b)(1)(A) status to securities litigation) and Coburn v. 4-R Corp.,
77 F.R.D. 43, 46 (E.D. Ky. 1977)(certifying (b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B) classes among
business invitees injured or killed in a supper club fire, for claims that were
purely for damages) with In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 305-
07 (6th Cir. 1984)(vacating by writ of mandate the (b)(1)(A) certification of tort
damage claims based in part on a faulty issue preclusion analysis) and Green v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1340-41 (9th Cir. 1976)(rejecting by
writ of mandate securities damage claims certified by lower court as (b)(1)(A)
class action). See also Dale Elec., Inc. v. R.C.L. Elec., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531 (D.N.H.
1971)(holding prosecution of separate actions by individual class members in pat-
ent infringement dispute would establish incompatible standards of conduct);
Sultan v. Bessemer-Birmingham Motel Assoc., 322 F. Supp. 86, 91 (S.D.N.Y.
1970)(granting class action certification based on 23(b)(1)(A) because of the risk
of inconsistent or varying adjudications in actions seeking damages cause by a
false prospectus).
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standards of conduct on the party opposing the class, it may be reason-
able to deny opt-out rights. This is particularly important in cases
where inconsistent injunctive orders could issue or where there is a
possibility of civil or criminal contempt enforceable by fines or
incarceration. 113
However, denying opt-out rights to absent class members in
(b)(1)(A) cases does not mean that notice giving opportunity to appear
should also be denied, as is now authorized and practiced under Rule
23. The (b)(1)(A) category contemplates antagonistic interests within
the class that may cause the defendant to engage in divergent and
incompatible standards of conduct.114 Divided interests among mem-
bers of the class indicate an adequacy of representation concern in
which notice giving opportunity to appear is essential to determine
the range of contentions and any need for additional representatives
or subclasses. Yet, this categorization generally leads to a denial of
notice. The existence of multipolar conflicts within the class would
strongly suggest that the opportunity to be heard must be granted in
order for all protesting points of view to be brought forth and fairly
adjudicated so that the question of adequacy of representation may be
fully explored.115
B. The (b)(1)(B) Category
Court decisions, commentaries, and historical precedent show that
class actions may be used to prevent a race to judgment, wherein the
first claimants to execute are fully compensated at the expense of later
claimants who receive little or nothing due to depleted assets from
payment of earlier judgments.116 A related type of case involves
claims to a single piece of property by multiple members of a class. In
113. A conflicting injunctive order situation would also fall within the (b)(2) category.
See discussion infra section V.C.
114. To illustrate, consider a governmental authority with responsibility to build a
dam, who may face a multipolar community reaction. If some members of the
community oppose the dam entirely, and some favor the dam limited to a certain
geographic area, while others desire a still larger dam to obtain greater electrical
power, the governmental entity faces incompatible standards of conduct; further,
some litigants may be suing for damages while others are seeking injunctions.
115. Defining and applying typicality and adequacy of representation requirements
becomes difficult under (b)(1)(A). If adequacy of representation is reduced to a
typicality standard, the representative could not operate to bind all absent mem-
bers since the representative could not be typical with a class that has incompati-
ble positions and interests. Unless subclasses are created, this type of situation
would clearly violate both identity of claims and conflicts of interest safeguards.
116. See Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280, 283 (8th Cir. 1978); Robertson v. NBA, 556
F.2d 682, 684-85 (2nd Cir. 1977); In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 110 F.R.D.
528, 536-37 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
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these limited fund or specific property cases, an individual judgment
impairs or impedes the interests of other claimants."17
The (b)(1)(B) category stresses the interests of the members of the
class whose claims may be impaired or impeded unless a class action
is certified."18 However, this key phrase, "impair or impede," is broad
and uncertain.119 The same language in Rules 19 and 24 has been
construed to apply when the absent party is adversely affected by the
stare decisis effect of litigation.120 This interpretation applied in the
context of Rule 23 means that since every absent class member may
be impaired by the stare decisis effect of litigation, every potential
class action could be classified as a (b)(1)(B) action, where notice giv-
ing appearance and opt-out rights may be denied. For this reason,
some courts have interpreted the "impaired or impeded" standard as
not including stare decisis effects.121
Nonetheless, the "impair or impede" concept remains one of great
elasticity.122 For example, it is unclear whether potential class claims
117. The (b)(1)(B) category is not restricted to limited fund or specific property
situations.
118. Rule 23(b)(1)B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of subdivison (a) are satisfied, and in
addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class would create a risk of
B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of
the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially im-
pair or impede their ability to protect their interests ....
FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
119. The (b)(1)(B) category is not a restatement of the old hybrid class action which
involved class interest in the same property or subject matter of the action. The
(b)(1)(B) category turns on the practical effect of the classification upon the mem-
bers of the class and does not require a claimed interest in the same fund or
property. Language of similar effect is found in Rule 24. However, the language
adopted by the Committee for the (b)(1)(B) action is free from historic restraints
imposed by related Rules 19 and 24. FED. R. Civ. P. 19, 24.
120. Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d. 818, 829 (5th Cir. 1967).
121. See Larionoffv. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1182-83 (D.C. Cir. 1976), aff'd on
other grounds, 431 U.S. 864 (1977); La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489
F.2d 461, 467 (9th Cir. 1973). See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 24, § 1774 n.4.
122. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick, No. 92-1373, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16670, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 1992)(in suit for negligent preparation of
financial statements and other tort and contract claims, the court held that since
a partner's admission against a co-partner may be admitted as a statement
against interest in separate civil actions, the suit may be classified as (b)(1)(B)
class action because rulings on evidence admissibility may be stare decisis in all
cases, thereby justifying denial of notice, appearance, and opt-out rights). See
also Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elec., 285 F. Supp. 714, 723
(N.D. Ill. 1968) (holding possible comity between courts justified (b)(1)(B)
classification).
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must exceed the assets of the defendant in order to satisfy this stan-
dard, or whether settlement "funds" would be included within this
concept.123 How the total amount of potential claims or potential as-
sets of the defendant are to be weighed is also unclear.124
C. The (b)(2) Category
The (b)(2) category involves either injunctive relief or correspond-
ing declaratory relief.125 Any case may qualify for declaratory relief
on certain issues even though the ultimate objective of the case may
be either injunctive relief or damages. The issue is whether such
cases involve "corresponding declaratory relief" within the meaning of
(b)(2).
Of course any type of action may involve declaratory relief at least
in part. For example, an action based on a product liability theory
may initially request a declaration of liability against the defend-
ant.126 The declaratory ruling may be useful in obtaining an injunc-
tion in a subsequent proceeding as well as providing a basis for
damages.
Whether combined injunction and damage actions may be certified
as (b)(2) is an issue on which courts disagree.127 While some have
123. If the "impair or impede" language is found to be applicable whenever a settle-
ment amount is offered for less than the total amount of the claims, any damage
action may be easily converted into a (b)(1)(B) action, thereby precluding appear-
ance and opportunity to opt out.
124. See In re Bendectin Prod. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 305-6 (6th Cir. 1984);
Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 46-7 (E.D. Ky. 1977). Compare In re Agent
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 726-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 818 F.2d
145 (2d Cir. 1987) (using a special master to conduct detailed investigation of the
substantial probability or possibility that the compensatory claims might exhaust
the assets and rejecting (b)(1)(B) on all claims except a punitive damages class),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988); with In re Greenman See. Litig., 94 F.R.D. 273
(S.D. Fla. 1982)(certifying class actions without investigation or findings of the
value of the claimed damage losses).
125. Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in
addition:
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to
the class as a whole.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
126. See WwGiiT Er A., supra note 24, § 1775 n.20.
127. See Laramore v. Illinois Sports Facilities Auth., No. 89-C-1067, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1893, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 18, 1993). In Laramore, the residents of low-
income housing in an area where a new stadium was to be built sought injunctive
relief and damages. The court certified the class under (b)(2) because even
though the class was seeking monetary damages, the injunctive relief was an
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held that the possibility of a damage award means that the full (b)(3)
rights must be afforded even in a declaratory relief action,128 other
courts have held that claims which combine injunctive and damage
relief should be classified as mandatory.129
D. The (b)(3) Category
The (b)(3) category of class actions is for damages. In order to
maintain a (b)(3) action, specific conditions must be met in addition to
the standard Rule 23(a) requirements.' 30
integral part of the relief for the class. See also Gelb v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
90 Civ. 7212, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11554, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1993). In
Gelb, the court noted that by requesting certification under (b)(2), the plaintiff
would avoid the notice and opt-out requirements of (b)(3), but allowed the plain-
tiff to pursue injunctive relief claim as class action without reference to damages.
The court concluded that no conflict existed with notice requirement under (b)(3)
because it was not considering whether to award damages at that time. It subse-
quently decided in its discretion not to order notice.
128. See Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1156 (11th Cir.) cert. denied,
464 U.S. 937 (1983); Penson v. Terminal Transp. Co., 634 F.2d 989, 993 (5th Cir.
1981); Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 437-38 (5th Cir. 1979).
129. See Dosier v. Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp., 656 F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir.
1981); Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 647 F.2d 388, 393 (3d Cir. 1981); Laskey v.
International Union, 638 F.2d 954, 956-57 (6th Cir. 1981); Reynolds v. NFL, 584
F.2d 280, 284 (8th Cir. 1978); Robertson v. NBA, 556 F.2d 682, 686 (2d Cir. 1977).
130. Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in
addition:
• (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually con-
trolling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or against members of the class;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the lit-
igation of the claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the manage-
ment of the class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
These requirements obviously bear upon all class action categories. The
structure of Rule 23(b)(3) does not mean that (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions may
have predominating uncommon questions, that the class device need not be supe-
rior to other procedural devices such as stare decisis, interpleader, or interven-
tion, that the individual's interest in controlling litigation is irrelevant to (b)(1)
and (b)(2) classes, or that judicial economy and manageability are not concerns in
the (b)(1) and (b)(2) cases. Although such conditions are not apparent from the
face of the rule, numerous cases cited below apply the above requirements to the
other categories.
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Rule 23(c)(2) provides that in a (b)(3) action, notice giving opportu-
nity to appear and to opt out must be given in the best practicable
manner,13 1 which includes individual notices to class members whose
names and addresses may be available upon a reasonable inquiry.
Such notice may be something beyond the reasonable notice required
under the constitutional Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co.132 standard, and may be expensive-a factor that prompts some
federal judges to classify actions as (b)(1) and (b)(2). 133 Class counsel
may not urge notice because such notice may reveal dissent within the
class leading to subclasses or decertification. Reducing the notice re-
quirement to reasonable notice would be less expensive and might re-
sult in notice being ordered in more cases.
E. The Impact of Categorization
Rule 23 leaves notice rights in (b)(1) and (b)(2) cases to the discre-
tion of the trial judge and fails to recognize that the granting of notice
may in certain cases be mandated under due process.13 4 As a part of
the discretionary notice provision, Rule 23 lists some of the advan-
tages of notice for absent members of the class: notice may inform the
court whether the class considers the representation to be fair and
adequate; notice may also influence the class to intervene and present
claims, defenses, or otherwise appear in the action. 135
131. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
132. 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
133. A key pragmatic factor issue is who pays for notice. Absent a settlement, notice
costs in the federal system are initially advanced by the class counsel. Hence, the
avoidance of substantial up-front costs is additional motivation for class repre-
sentatives and counsel to seek certification as something other than a (b)(3) class.
134. In explaining discretionary notice, the Advisory Committee commented indirectly
that the need for notice would be minimal to the extent that there is cohesiveness
or unity in the class and that representation is effective. The Advisory Commit-
tee observed that mandatory and discretionary notice provisions are designed to
fulfill the due process requirements set forth in Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32
(1940), and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
FED. R. Crv. P. 23(d)(2) advisory committee's note (1966). However, Rule 23 on its
face does not alert the legal community to the requisite analysis of claims which
are essential in evaluating cohesiveness or unity of the class.
135. Rule 23(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which
this rule applies the court may make appropriate orders:
(2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or
otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such
manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step
in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the oppor-
tunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation
fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or other-
wise come into the action.
FED. R. Crv. P. 23(d)(2).
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Although the court may alleviate potential due process problems
by exercising its power to create subclasses and to appoint additional
representatives appropriate for each of the subclasses, or by defining
the scope of the class action by limiting the issues, such suggested
techniques for solving due process problems are not a substitute for
the lack of clarity in Rule 23.136 Such ambiguity within the rule has
led to category games, which seriously jeopardize notice, appearance,
and opt-out rights.
The adverse impact of the categories and structure of the amended
Rule 23 may be summarized as follows:
(1) Distraction and confusion which result from combining two
separate and distinct issues: whether class action is the superior device
for efficiently resolving disputes, and what degree of protection should
be afforded to absent class members as a matter of fairness and due
process.
Class actions are now accepted as efficient. The only standard
should be whether the device is superior to other procedural methods
of adjudication. The categories have outlived their utility, and the ex-
tensive legal effort and hairsplitting involved in isolating and defining
the ambiguous lines only detract from analysis of fairness. Because of
the distraction of category games, careful scrutiny of adequacy of rep-
resentation on the claims, remedies, and issues is often missing in
most federal courts.
(2) The fallacy of the injunction/damage distinction and the irra-
tionality of mandated notice for (b)(3) but not for (b)(1) or (b)(2)
actions.
In determining whether notice is required, the primary issue
should be adequacy of representation through identity of claims. If
there is historic identity of claims, fairness and due process are satis-
fied and notice is not required, although discretionary notice may still
be appropriate in certain cases. If identity of claims is not satisfied or
if evidence of identity is insufficient, notice should be required for pur-
poses of ascertaining the scope of claims, remedies, and issues, and
determining adequacy of representation for any atypical or divergent
claims. The current category distinctions for notice-(b)(1) and (b)(2)
actions, for which notice is not required, versus (b)(3) actions, where
notice is required137-are not structured in the context of identity of
claims or adequacy of representation.
136. For example, Rule 23(b)(3) does not discuss the issue of binding out-of-court
claimants, nor does it make observations or requirements for the special
problems of defendant class actions.
137. Numerous commentators have noted the arbitrary and irrational distinction
drawn by the Rule between legal and equitable relief and notice rights. See, e.g.,
George Rutherglen, Notice, Scope and Preclusion in Title VII Class Actions, 69
VA. L. REv. 11, 26 n.65 (1983).
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Rule 23 makes the fallacious assumption that all actions in which
the sole remedy sought is damages involve diverse and atypical issues
which cannot be adequately represented, and therefore the rule pro-
vides that notice must be given in all (b)(3) actions. To illustrate, a
class action involving a single legal issue, such as whether employees
are entitled to vacation pay on the Fourth of July, may be framed
solely as a damage action. The amount of damages may be a matter of
simple mathematical computation, albeit individually applied. In
such a case, the sole issue is a question of law as to whether vacation
pay is owed. Since the damage claims of the class are fully encom-
passed in the representative's claim, satisfaction of adequacy of repre-
sentation would be far easier in this type of case than in an injunctive
action or in (b)(1)(A) or (b)(1)(B) actions. A decision against the repre-
sentative in this hypothetical damage action should be binding on the
class under due process even if notice giving appearance or opt-out
rights has not been extended.
Conversely, Rule 23 assumes that notice is not required in (b)(1)
and (b)(2) cases because such cases supposedly involve homogeneous
classes, and adequacy of representation is thereby fully assured. In-
junctive or declaratory relief may involve multiple issues and a wide
disparity of interests and remedies. By definition, (b)(1)(A) actions in-
volve class claimants who are competing with each other.1 3 8 More-
over, adequacy of representation is not automatic in (b)(2) cases. For
example, a case seeking declaratory or injunctive relief with respect to
integration in Los Angeles schools may involve diverse claims and
conflicting remedies. Yet classifying this action as (b)(2) means that
notice and opportunity to appear or opt out are not required. Ade-
quacy of representation requires a continuing investigation and analy-
sis of each claim, remedy, and issue in every case, and if adequate
representation is found to be lacking, notice should be required as a
matter of due process, regardless of whether the relief sought involves
damages or injunctive remedies.
The Advisory Committee's explanation as to why notice is required
under (b)(3) but not under the other categories is that an individual's
interest is greater in a (b)(3) claim.139 It assumes that an individual
138. See discussion supra section V.A.
139. Rule 23(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained;
Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the
court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who
can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each
member that
(A) the court will exclude the member from the class if the
member so requests by a specified date;
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has a greater interest in seeking damages than in pursuing injunctive
or declaratory relief. The Advisory Committee gives no reason for
these tenuous and erroneous assumptions.
(3) The irrational linking of notice giving opportunity to appear
with notice giving opportunity to opt out.
These two concepts have different rationales and purposes. To il-
lustrate, opt-out rights ordinarily should not be granted in (b)(1)(A) or
(b)(1)(B) cases because the exercise of such rights in (b)(1)(A) cases
may defeat the resolution of divergent claims and subject the oppo-
nent to incompatible standards of conduct, and in (b)(1)(B) cases, may
result in a race to judgment. On the other hand, notice giving oppor-
tunity to be heard should be granted for purposes of clarifying the
scope of class claims, issues, and remedies, and evaluating the ade-
quacy of representation.140 This combination of appearance and opt-
out rights in the rule has caused many courts to refuse notice
altogether.141
(4) The conflicting of (a)(3)(typicality) and (a)(4)(adequacy of rep-
resentation) requirements in (b)(3) cases.
The (a)(3) and (a)(4) requirements historically require an identity
of liability claims between the named representative and the class.
However, (b)(3) cases may include claims in which there are non-pre-
dominating liability questions affecting only individual members of
the class. As a practical matter, representative claims cannot be typi-
cal when there are uncommon liability claims within the class, and
uncommon claims cannot be adequately represented under an identity
(B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all
members who do not request exclusion; and
(C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if the
member desires, enter an appearance through counsel.
FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(c)(2).
140. Some confusion is generated by labelling (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes as "mandatory"
and (b)(3) classes as "discretionary." If the focus is notice, it may be argued that a
(b)(3) class action is mandatory because notice must be given and a right to opt
out must be afforded, whereas in (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions, giving of notice and opt-
out rights are not required but may be given at the court's discretion. See discus-
sion supra sections V.A-V.D.
141. However, a few courts in their discretion have properly separated appearance
and opt-out rights. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Deloitte & Touche, 822 F. Supp.
1512, 1516 (D. Colo. 1993)(citing Robertson v. NBA, 556 F.2d 682, 686 (2d Cir.
1977)). In R.T.C. v. Deloitte & Touche, the court concluded that notice should be
given to three subclasses of defendants to preserve opportunity for absent class
members to intervene or move to decertify, but denied the defendants' request for
opt-out rights on the ground that it would impair the central purpose of a(b)(1)(B) action. The court held that preclusion of a right to opt out did not violate
due process.
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of claims standard.142 Rule 23 should make clear that if non-predomi-
nating liability claims affect only individual members, fairness and
due process are satisfied by notice giving rights to appear and opt
Out.143
(5) The insufficiency of the notice concerning claims, issues, and
remedies.
Notices must be sufficiently clear, understandable, and informative
to enable class members to rationally decide whether to appear, opt
out, or remain in the action and be bound by the outcome. Unfortu-
nately, even where notice is ordered, the majority of notices are insuf-
ficient in content or misleading. The typical notice only lists the
names of representatives and counsel, and contains little or no infor-
mation about the claims, issues, and remedies sought by the repre-
sentatives as compared with the class.' 44 From such notice, the class
member cannot determine which of his claims and remedies are repre-
sented; thus, an informed and rational choice is impossible.14 5
VI. SETTLEMENT
Amended Rule 23(e) requires notice to class members and judicial
approval for settlement or compromise of any class action.146 The the-
ory is that combining judicial approval with notice provides sufficient
due process protection for the rights of absent class members in settle-
ment. In practice, however, these pro forma safeguards serve little
purpose. Class counsel and class opponents often subvert proper judi-
cial supervision; notice of settlement is usually defective in either con-
tent, dissemination, or both; the named representatives have virtually
no participation in class proceedings or have conflicting interests with
the class; settlement hearings are cursory and limited; and appellate
review, even if obtained, is rarely meaningful.
Under a literal interpretation of Rule 23(e), court approval is not
required unless a certified class action is dismissed or compro-
mised.147 Hence, pre-certification settlements with individual mem-
142. See Mattoon v. City of Pittsfield, 128 F.R.D. 17, 19-20 (D. Mass. 1989)(finding
typicality and adequacy of representation but denying (b)(3) certification because
the uncommon claims predominated).
143. Non-exercise of appearance or opt-out rights acts as consent.
144. See Jordan v. Global Natural Resources, Inc., 104 F.R.D. 447, 448 (S.D. Ohio
1984)(rejecting notice with description of the representation and adopted abbrevi-
ated form instead). Cf Chicken Delight, Inc. v. Harris, 412 F.2d 830, 831 (9th
Cir. 1969)(limiting notice to one of two issues because it would involve signifi-
cantly different evidence and separate factual determination as to each class
member and imposing such a burden would be inconsistent with Rule 23).
145. See infra subsection VI.C.8.
146. FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(e).
147. See Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding notice requirement
of Rule 23(e) does not apply to involuntary dismissals, although court approval is
[Vol. 73:646
FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS
bers of the proposed class might not fall within the scope of Rule
23(e).1 48 The policy of Rule 23(e), however, has been extended to class
action settlements that occur prior to class certification.49 Cases re-
veal that courts are willing to approve settlements without certifica-
tion as long as notice is given to absentees,15o notwithstanding the
fact that without certification, neither adequate representation nor
res judicata is assured with respect to the absent class members.151
Settlement is a critical juncture where adequacy of representation
should be reassessed.15 2 Courts are directed to monitor adequacy of
representation throughout the entire course of litigation in order to
assure a fair and reasonable judgment for all class members. Such
judicial oversight is intended to supplement, not function in lieu of,
adequate representation. But in reality, adequacy of representation is
virtually ignored in the majority of class action settlements..53
The class action lawsuit is a modem bill of peace. Thus, binding
judgments, dismissals with prejudice, and general releases are de-
manded as consideration for settlement by the parties opposing the
class. No defendant wants to pay several million dollars into a settle-
ment fund only to discover that later, additional persons may bring
still necessary) cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971). See generally John J. Conroy,
Jr., Comment, Notice of Postjudgment Settlements in Class Action Litigation, 73
Nw. U. L. Rxv. 909 (1978)(stating that Rule 23(e) also does not apply to post-
judgment settlements, which may lead to additional problems. The recom-
mended practice with respect to post-judgment settlements would be to give no-
tice or to obtain judicial approval consistent with the policy of Rule 23.).
148. See Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455
F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972).
149. See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. (E.D. Pa.
1967)(holding that an action settled before certification presumptively must be
considered as a class action so as to require court approval according to Rule
23(e)). See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 24, § 1797 n.19 (citing other cases that
settled at certification or cases in which settlement was delayed until class was
certified). Cf Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir.
1971)(requiring notice and court approval of settlement without 23(c)(1)
certification).
150. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 24, § 1797 n.24.
151. A binding settlement, with res judicata effect, is particularly crucial for the oppo-
nents of the class, who are seeking a complete resolution of litigation.
152. Rule 16(c)(9) instructs the court to encourage settlement. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9).
Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence further encourages settlement by
prohibiting class litigants from establishing liability using communications made
during compromise negotiations. FED. R. Evm. 408.
153. See Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securi-
ties Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497, 498 n.2 (1991)(stating "the familiar ax-
iom that a bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial" (quoting In re
Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd,
798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986)). See generally Sylvia R. Lazlos, Note, Abuse in Plain-
tiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a Guardian During Pretrial Settle-
ment Negotiations, 84 MicH. L. Ray. 308, 308 n.1 (1985)(citing the rules and
studies on the subject of encouraging settlement in class action litigation).
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litigation. But such finality means that those absent members of the
class who stand to lose their claims require a certain level of
protection.
A study of all class actions in the Northern District of California
from 1985 to 1993 reveals that over eighty percent were resolved by
settlement.154 An in-depth analysis of the settlement process is cru-
cial for evaluating the protection afforded to the class in these cases.
A. The Alignment of Interests Against Absent Class
Members in the Settlement Process
The adversarial system resolves disputes by having each side pres-
ent its best arguments and evidence before a neutral court. In con-
trast, the class action settlement procedure, established pursuant to
Rule 23, is non-adversarial for the most part, lacks sufficient support-
ing evidence, and produces results contrary to the interests of absent
class members.
1. The Named Representative
If the requirement of adequate representation, including identity
of claims, is satisfied, the named representative will be motivated to
seek maximum settlement benefits on all claims.155 This motivation
may be diluted, however, if the representative is offered preferences
over the absent class members in the settlement plan.'5 6 Moreover,
settlement generally relieves the named representative of all ultimate
responsibility for costs, which may serve as further incentive for the
representative to assent to settlement. This is true particularly in
those jurisdictions where liability for costs by the named representa-
tive is a prerequisite for maintaining a class action.
Absent these factors, the representative may still be powerless to
act on behalf of the class during settlement negotiations and approval.
The representative's participation is usually minimal both during liti-
gation and during settlement proceedings. The fact that courts are
free to ignore any objections to settlement made by the named repre-
sentative further encourages passivity; class representatives seldom
voice their views during settlement negotiations or appear at settle-
ment hearings.
2. Class Counsel
Class attorneys are directly influenced by the anticipated mone-
tary return. In many instances, the attorney who acts as class counsel
154. See infra appendix A, chart B.
155. See discussion supra Part I.
156. Preferences granted to named representatives are generally not disclosed in the
notice of settlement and hearing.
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is a litigation entrepreneur who has initiated and promoted the class
action in order to obtain maximum profit at minimal risk.157 Since
risk of loss increases with the approach of trial' 5 8 and settling the
class action early maximizes the hourly return for class counsel, class
counsel's motivation conflicts with the interest of the class in that the
lower amount obtained in the earlier stages of litigation may undercut
the value of class claims.
The dangers of attorney abuse based on economic motivation, in-
cluding "sweetheart" deals such as fee agreements attached to dismis-
sals, are well-documented in cases and literature.159 Fee awards
made part of the settlement agreement are generally accepted and ap-
proved by courts, often without any extensive inquiry as to the hours
spent or the quality of representation. The opportunistic attorney
may seek and include as part of the settlement an acceptance or at
least non-opposition to padded hours or overstaffed activities.
This basic conflict of financial interest between class counsel and
the class is built into every class action.' 6 0 Except in extreme cases,
however, such as collusion with opponents of the class, this conflict is
not one that is recognized as defeating class status, otherwise no class
action would be certified.161 As previously discussed, such conflict is
particularly acute in relation to settlement.162 Very little judicial su-
157. See Burns, supra note 62, at 196 (proposing court-appointed monitors for class
attorneys); John C. Coffee Jr., supra note 62, (recognizing conflicts between coun-
sel and class).
158. Loss includes costs advanced by class counsel to maintain the class action, as well
as anticipated attorneys' fees, which are normally contingent upon recovery.
159. E.g., Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518 (1st Cir. 1991); Lowen-
schuss v. Bluhdorn, 613 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980), affg 78 F.R.D. 675 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); Mary K. Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks:
Evaluating the Role of the Class Action Lawyer, 66 Tax. L. REv. 385 (1987).
160. See discussion supra section IV.C.
161. Even public interest attorneys may have conflicts with the class with respect to
goals and remedies of the class action suit. For example, while the attorney may
see the case as one that could establish injunctive relief which would alleviate
sexual or racial discrimination for decades in a company's business practices, the
present employee members of the class may prefer monetary damages in hand
rather than amorphous regulation of future conduct.
162. See supra subsection IV.C.2. See also Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Ill. Natl
Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677, 681-82 (7th Cir. 1987)(problem in class action
setting which necessitates court approval of settlements is that class counsel is
potentially an unreliable agent of his principals); Kenneth W. Dam, Class Ac-
tions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL
STU. 47 (1975); Andrew Rosenfield, An Empirical Test of Class-Action Settle-
ment, 5 J. LEGAL SwUn. 113 (1976). According to Rosenfield, a partial solution to
the problem of named plaintiffs being nominees or pawns of the lawyer, and un-
named class members having too little at stake to spend time monitoring the
class lawyer, would be to have lawyers compete to represent the class. Courts
note the importance of judicial review of fairness of settlement to class members
before allowing settlement to go into effect and extinguish claims of those who do
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pervision of legal fees occurs during or after settlement.16 3 Even
when such monitoring takes place, it fails to resolve the conflict de-
scribed herein. The Manual for Complex Litigation catalogues a wide
range of attorney abuses,164 which further support the conclusion that
more, not less, restraint upon attorneys is necessary to protect the
class.165
3. Opponents of the Class
Where a finding of defendant liability is probable, a class action
settlement might result in a lower amount of total damages compared
to the aggregate of individual claims tried independently. Defense
counsel, therefore, seek the broadest possible judgment and release for
their clients in settlement and negotiate for settlement amounts
within insurance limits. Needless to say, the interest of absent class
members is not among the concerns of defense counsel, except to the
extent that they seek a complete and binding resolution via settlement
to avoid any subsequent individual claims.
Even if it seems unlikely that the class would prevail on its claims,
class opponents might want to settle out as quickly as possible in or-
der to avoid rising attorneys' fees and costs or to mitigate the potential
negative impact of protracted litigation, such as bad press, poor public
relations, and disruption of normal business activities.' 6 6 Factors
which cause settlement unrelated to merits include (1) unusually risk-
averse defendants, (2) astronomically high potential damages, (3) an
hours-based contingency compensation system for plaintiffs' lawyers,
(4) agency problems inherent in class actions, and (5) insurance and
indemnification rules that make substantial sums of money not paid
directly by the parties available for negotiated settlements but not for
judgments after trial.167
Insurance also plays a dominant role in inducing settlement. De-
fendants generally want to maximize insurance coverage, and negoti-
not opt out of the settlement by effect of res judicata, especially in cases where
class certification is deferred to the settlement stage. Id.
163. Recently, the author attempted to refer a case to a prominent plaintiff class ac-
tion firm, to be paid hourly at rates of $400-plus per hour in monthly billing peri-
ods. The referral was declined because the law firm, which specialized in class
lawsuits with "rapid resolutions," was averaging in excess of $1,000 per hour.
164. MANUAL FOR Cow=LEX LITIGATION § 1.41 (5th ed. 1982).
165. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Share-
holder Litigation, 48 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 69-74; Bryant
Garth, The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives from an Em-
pirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 353 (1988).
166. In a study of shareholder class action lawsuits for securities fraud, which were
filed following stock market fluctuations in high technology stock issued during
1983, the findings show that the merits of the litigation were almost entirely di-
vorced from settlement considerations. See Alexander, supra note 153, at 523.
167. Id. at 500.
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ating a settlement to frame the case in terms of claims within the
scope of coverage is preferable to taking the case to trial, which could
expose defendants to uninsured claims.' 68 Typical are settlement
agreements that are based on the weaker claim of negligent misrepre-
sentation, instead of intentional misrepresentation which is not cov-
ered by insurance. 169 Furthermore, limits on insurance coverage
encourage settlements within amounts provided under the policy. The
fact that insurance companies continue to sell officers and directors
indemnification policies and other indemnity insurance supports the
conclusion that the cost of class settlements is built into a profitable
insurance market.
4. The Court
Settlement approval allows the court to quickly resolve hundreds
of claims and clear the calendar. Although courts ostensibly are en-
trusted with protecting the due process rights of absent class mem-
bers, constraints on time and resources severely limit the courts'
ability to evaluate the scope of class claims, remedies, issues, and the
course of settlement negotiations. Courts are generally captive to
whatever assertions are made by counsel, and independent investiga-
tions by the courts into the fairness of settlements seldom occur. In
short, judicial economy takes precedence over the protection of absent
class member interests.
5. The Absent Class Members
Absent members of the class face very little risk in going to trial
and tend to be more concerned with the merits of the claim and the
net recovery. They have little or no burden in terms of discovery, little
risk of counterclaims, no need to deal directly with attorneys, and they
incur little cost. If the class action proceeds to a successful conclusion,
absent class members receive their portion of the award either from
settlement or judgment, with no more direct effort or involvement
than submitting a simplified claim form.
However, no participation also means no control. If unnamed
members decide to appear and object to settlement, their concerns and
protests are often trampled in the rush to settle. Furthermore, absent
class members have little chance of getting an approved settlement
overturned in appellate review.
Although the adequate representation requirement is the primary
protection available to absent class members, settlement proceedings
168. Id. at 557.
169. Id. (citing interview with David B. Gold, plaintiffs' attorney in In re Eagle Com-
puter Sec. Litig., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,741
(March 26, 1986), in Stanford, California (May 10, 1990)).
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rarely entail any examination into adequacy of representation despite
the fact that settlement will extinguish the class claims. Only in a
limited number of cases where notice elicited objections from the class
have courts engaged in more thorough evaluations of settlement
proposals.17o
B. Special Problems in Pre-certification Settlements
The court may tentatively certify the class for settlement purposes
without public hearing and set the matter for settlement notice and
hearing pursuant to Rule 23(e).171 Pre-certification settlements raise
special problems in addition to aggravating the general defects in the
settlement process. By definition, the pre-certification settlement
agreement is negotiated by counsel who is not the official authorized
representative attorney for the class at that time.
As the Seventh Circuit observed in In re General Motors Corp. En-
gine Interchange Litigation,172 pre-certification settlements invariably
affect the integrity of the negotiation process. Among the dangers of
pre-certification settlement is attorney-shopping by the defendant
with respect to settlement negotiations. Since the attorney purporting
to represent the class is not yet the official authorized representative,
a defendant may undermine negotiations by attempting to reach a
more favorable settlement with an attorney representing another
member of the class rather than deal with the "unofficial class coun-
sel." Thus, unauthorized settlement negotiations necessarily entail
the plaintiffs' bargaining from a position of weakness.17 3 Further-
more, unauthorized settlement negotiations deny other class counsel
access to information concerning such negotiations which may be
helpful in evaluating the fairness of the settlement.174
170. See infra appendix A, chart C.
171. Almost 50% of class actions are settled before the class has been certified, subject
to certification and settlement approval by the court. See infra appendix A.
172. 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
173. See id. at 1125. Cf In re Boesky Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1991)(involv-
ing lead counsel who had authority to enter into settlement agreements, and set-
tlements could contain a provision for a reduction or satisfaction of any judgment
against the nonsettling defendant). See also William E. Haudek, The Settlement
and Approval of Stockholders'Actions-Part II: The Settlement, 23 Sw. L.J. 765,
771-72 (1969). Houdek notes that although courts will not approve settlements
which are unfair or inadequate, "fairness" may be found anywhere within a broad
range of lower and upper limits. Whether a given "fair" compromise might not
have been more fair if the negotiating attorney possessed better information or
had been animated by undivided loyalty to the class is not discernible. The court
may reject a settlement as being inadequate; it cannot undertake the partisan
task of bargaining for better terms. Id.
174. See In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1125
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979)(holding that information relevant to
an attorney's proper exercise of fiduciary duty to the class includes options con-
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The temptation to enter into an early "sweetheart" deal with class
opponents, thereby ensuring class counsel status and fees, is almost
irresistible. Even public interest attorneys are not exempt from the
defects inherent in pre-certification settlements. The prestige of nego-
tiating a large settlement against a corporate defendant, thus acquir-
ing a reputation as a consumer advocate, may place public interest
attorneys in a situation analogous to private counsel who hope to win
large fee awards by becoming class counsel.175
Although some courts have required that certification granted for
purposes of settlement must be given special scrutiny,176 the reality is
that such scrutiny simply is not possible in non-adversarial proceed-
ings with a non-existent record. Pre-certification settlements magnify
the existing defects in the class action settlement process: conflicts
within the class as to claims, issues, and remedies are buried, and
adequacy of representation is ignored; the bases for attorneys' fees are
vague and often unsubstantiated, with fee-sharing agreements undis-
closed; a record on the merits may not exist; the court has no informa-
tion or participation in the settlement, and judicial approval is
perfunctory rather than supervisory.
C. Deficiencies in the Settlement Process
1. No Record on the Merits
Generally, combined certification-settlements do not have a factual
record on the merits. In the class action study, forty-seven percent of
the cases had little or no discovery prior to certification-settlement.177
Although extensive inquiries into the merits are neither required nor
appropriate for settlement approval, only those cases which proceed in
litigation mode for a substantial period of time produce any type of
record from which a court can evaluate the fairness of a settlement
proposal.
In practice, courts rely primarily on the arguments and recommen-
dations of counsel,' 78 despite inherent conflicts of interest,179 which in
sidered and rejected, the topics discussed, the defendant's reaction to various pro-
posals, and the amount of compromise necessary to obtain resolution by
settlement).
175. Id. Cf Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1318, 1552
(1976)(noting the conflict of interests created not only by counsel seeking large
fees after settlement, but also by counsel pursuing "his own ideological goals
without regard to the desires of class members").
176. Mars Steel v. Continental Ill. Natl Bank & Trust, 834 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir.
1987); Plummer v. Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d 654, 657-81 (2d Cir. 1982).
177. See infra appendix A, chart C and comments.
178. Cf Anderson v. Torrington Co., 755 F. Supp. 834 (N.D. Ind. 1991)(ordering coun-
sel to submit outlines of the evidence on the merits).
179. See discussion supra Part II.
19941 689
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
effect delegates to the attorneys the courts' duty to protect the inter-
ests of absent class members.18 0
2. The Failure to Require a Showing and Make Findings on
Adequacy of Representation
In practice, the papers seeking conditional certification in conjunc-
tion with settlement do not focus on adequacy of representation. The
named representatives are identified only by name or a minimal de-
scription which does not disclose their claims, the issues, and the rem-
edies they are seeking. Hence, courts have no basis for evaluating the
identity of claims requirement, (i.e., comparing the claims of the
named representatives with those of the class). Nonetheless, courts
routinely approve such conditional certifications without inquiry, evi-
dence, or findings. Similarly, notices for settlement hearing are defi-
cient in terms of informing the class as to adequacy of representation.
Certain appellate decisions strongly condemn this practice.1S1 The
Second Circuit, in Plummer v. Chemical Bank,182 declared that ade-
quacy of representation and fairness of compromise are questions of
fact for the district court, and while courts are not expected to convert
settlement hearings into mini-trials on the merits, they should explore
the facts to the extent that would render feasible intelligent determi-
nations concerning adequacy and fairness.' 8 3 The Second Circuit fur-
ther admonished that findings and conclusions should not be based
solely on the arguments and recommendations of counsel; there must
be some evidentiary foundation in support of the proposed
settlement.184
180. Contra Plummer v. Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d 654, 659 (2d Cir. 1982).
181. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992); In re General
Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 870 (1979); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157,
1169 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979). Since interests of the
lawyer and the class may diverge, as may the interests of different members of
the class, certain interests may be wrongfully compromised or sold out without
drawing the court's attention. Class settlements are susceptible to abuse because
of the limited control exercisable by class members. Id.
182. 668 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1982).
183. Id. at 659.
184. See id. at 659 n.4. "Simply put, a court may not delegate to counsel the perform-
ance of its duty to protect the interests of absent class members." Id. The district
court in Plummer was bound to withhold approval of the settlement until the
joint settlement proposal had been closely and carefully scrutinized to ensure
that it was fair, adequate, reasonable, and not influenced in any way by fraud or
collusion. Furthermore, the court had to be satisfied that in this type of across-
the-board settlement the named plaintiffs were adequate representatives of the
entire class and had no interests antagonistic to the other class members. Id. at
658.
[Vol. 73:646
FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS
Notwithstanding these critical opinions, the study on class action
practice disclosed that no evidence or findings were made with respect
to adequacy of representation in approximately eighty percent of the
class actions in the Northern District of California.185 Extensive vio-
lations of Rule 23(a) and due process occurred where certification and
settlement were combined or where certification was granted condi-
tional to settlement.18 6
3. Lack of Named Representative Participation
One of the purported functions of the named representative is to
act as a check on class counsel. For example, if the class claims are
unfairly compromised or otherwise sacrificed in settlement by the
class attorney, the representative whose interests coincide with the
class would be expected to defend the class interests and object to
quick settlements that offer minimal recovery for the class.
In reality, however, most courts and counsel ignore the named rep-
resentative during most of the class action proceedings, including set-
tlement. Class counsel is not required to consult with the
representative, and courts do not require or solicit any feedback or
information concerning the views of the named representative in the
settlement hearing. In the Northern California class action study,
class representatives did not participate in 100% of the cases.18 7
Although some courts required a certain level of representative
participation in the early 1970s,188 the recent trend is to shunt aside
any obstacles in the way of class action settlements. Not only are rep-
resentatives generally discouraged from voicing their views, any objec-
tions made by representatives are frequently overruled by judges
relying primarily on the opinions of class counsel.' 8 9
The current trend essentially nullifies the requirements of Rule
23(a). It is absurd to require identity of claims to initiate a class ac-
tion only to cast aside the class representative throughout the remain-
der of the case. The reasoning of General Telephone Co. v. Falcon'90
should govern: attorney consultation with class representatives
should be mandated by and reported to the court, and the views of the
representative should be accorded substantial weight in the settle-
ment hearing in evaluating whether a proposed settlement is fair, ad-
equate, and reasonable.19x
185. See infra appendix A, chart C.
186. In cases where separate adversarial certification hearings were held, at least the
essential protections were the subject of some degree of scrutiny.
187. See infra appendix A.
188. See supra Part I.
189. See supra Part IlI.
190. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
191. Id. at 161.
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4. Intra-Class Conflicts Buried in the Settlement Process
a. Dissent Among the Class
Dissent among the class may create complications and delay,
which stand in the way of easy certification and settlement approval.
Class counsel has no duty to affirmatively ascertain or disclose intra-
class dissent and may even oppose notice which could reveal conflicts
within the class. The fact that counsel must also advance the cost of
notice serves as an additional disincentive for class attorneys to un-
cover dissent.
Courts also are under no affirmative duty to investigate the possi-
bility of intra-class dissent. The failure to give adequate notice of a
settlement plan of distributions and preferences combined with the
cursory nature of settlement proceedings further contributes to the
egregious lack of protection afforded to class members.
b. Undisclosed Preferences
One source of intra-class conflict stems from preferences granted to
class representatives.192 Presumably, named representatives protect
the class because they have the same claims as class members. Pref-
erences-justified as compensation for time and effort expended on be-
half of the class and in some jurisdictions for incurring direct or
indirect financial costs-realign interests between the representative
and the rest of the class.193 Such bonuses or extra compensation en-
able class counsel to buy off dissenters and avoid the troublesome is-
sues of conflict, unfairness, and inadequacy of representation.
Often the fact of such preference is not disclosed to the class in the
notice of settlement hearing, which effectively eliminates any objec-
tions that may be forthcoming had such information concerning settle-
ment been revealed.194 Cases in the late 1970s and early 1980s
abhorred such preferences,'95 but recent cases permit such practices
more freely.' 96 In the Northern District of California study of class
192. Notice of settlement often does not disclose the existence of preferences.
193. To illustrate, if class members each have claims with the asserted value of
$10,000, a settlement of five cents on the dollar may elicit strong objections from
the representatives. However, if the representatives are given bonuses of
$10,000 from the settlement fund for their "efforts" on behalf of the class, the
named representatives cease to have identity of claims with the rest of the class
since they stand to gain more from accepting the terms of the settlement.
194. In addition, the plan of distribution of the settlement fund, in which preferences
are normally disclosed, is neither included nor even summarized in the notice of
settlement hearing.
195. Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144 (11th Cir. 1983); Plummer v.
Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1982); In re General Motors Interchange
Litig., 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
196. White v. Morris, 811 F. Supp. 341 (S.D. Ohio 1992)(upholding settlement
although only the named representatives received monetary damages); Enter-
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actions, preferences were granted to representatives or portions of the
class in thirty seven percent of the cases, based only upon general rec-
ommendations of class counsel, without presentation of any support-
ing evidence.19 7 Even if the justification for preferences is accepted,
courts should require evidence of the representative's extra time and
effort and their reasonable value. In cases where settlement approval
was denied, obvious preferences granted to representatives over ab-
sent class members were revealed prior to the settlement hearing,198
but even such egregious preferences have been upheld in other
decisions.' 99
5. Defects in the Content of Notice for Settlement Hearing200
The general rule regarding the content of settlement notices is that
the notice must "fairly apprise the prospective members of the class of
prise Energy Corp. v. Columbus Gas Transmission Corp., 137 F.R.D. 240 (S.D.
Ohio 1991)(giving incentive award of $50,000 to each of the six class
representatives).
197. See infra appendix A.
198. See Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144 (11th Cir. 1983)(awarding one
half of back pay to eight named plaintiffs held to be unfair); Plummer v. Chemical
Bank, 668 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1982)(requiring additional evidentiary support for
more generous treatment given to named plaintiffs over other members of the
class).
199. See, e.g., In re Jackson Lockdown/MCO Cases, 107 F.R.D. 703 (E.D. Mich.
1985)(named representative plaintiffs to receive $2,000 to file suit and aggres-
sively pursue litigation).
200. The drafters of Rule 23 in 1966 apparently decided on two different notice
requirements for two specific class action procedures.
Rule 23(c)(2) states that "[in any class action maintained under subdivision
(b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort." FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(c)(2) This is similar to,
but more specific than, the Mullane standard which relies on notice "reasonably
calculated to reach interested parties." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950).
In contrast, Rule 23(e) states with respect to dismissal or compromise that "[a]
class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all
members of the class in such manner as the court directs." FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(e)
Under Rule 23(e), the court has discretion as to the means of notice employed and
its content so long as Mullane is satisfied. See WMGHT ET AL., supra note 24,
§ 1797 n.54 (1986 & Supp. 1994)(citing cases with variety of notice schemes
upheld by the courts).
The Mullane standard of settlement notice, contemplated by Rule 23(e),
requires less than the notice of certification for damages in a (b)(3) proceeding.
Thus, settlement notice should be formulated to "apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950).
In general, courts have protected absentees at least as to the manner of
service. See Silber v. Mabon, 957 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1992)(finding the notice was
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the terms of the proposed settlement and of the [available] options."201
Class members should receive enough information in the notice so
that they may decide whether to object or, if permitted, to opt out.
The usual notices, however, fall substantially short of providing suffi-
cient or accurate information to render rational decisiomnaking
possible.
a. Adequacy of Representation Is Not Described
Despite the fact that adequate representation is integral to the
fairness of a settlement,202 adequacy of representation is seldom de-
scribed in notices or even listed as an issue for the settlement hearing.
The most fundamental principles underlying class actions limit the
powers of the class representatives to the claims they possess in com-
mon with other members of the class. Yet the typical settlement no-
tice does not describe the claims and remedies of the named
representatives, which means that class members cannot know
whether they have been adequately represented in settlement negoti-
ations. None of the class notices in the Northern District of California
study provided any information concerning adequacy of
representation.203
Several lower court decisions have justified such deficiencies by
holding that notice is only designed to serve as guidance to the major
terms of agreement and to enable further inquiry.204 The flaw in this
reasoning, however, is that few if any class members with small or
medium-sized claims are willing or able to travel to a distant city to
examine the court records in order to obtain necessary information
not the best practicable notice when class representative provided notices to
brokerage house but notices were not forwarded).
201. Philadelphia Housing Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
323 F. Supp. 364, 378 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
202. Adequacy of representation remains a viable issue at every stage of the class ac-
tion proceeding and information concerning representation is crucial to a decision
to object or to opt out.
203. See infra appendix A.
204. O'Brien v. National Property Analysts Partners, 739 F. Supp. 896, 901 (S.D.N.Y.
1990). Accord In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 224 (5th
Cir. 1981)(stating that although the notice might have been better had it in-
cluded the information that some of the representatives believed the settlement
to be inadequate, the failure to require such information was not an abuse of
court discretion), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982). See also Jordan v. Global Nat-
ural Resources, Inc., 104 F.R.D. 447, 448 (S.D. Ohio 1984)(rejecting the longer
notice which included a description of the named plaintiff and his cause of action,
and deciding that the abbreviated notice, which identified neither the named
plaintiff nor counsel, was adequate); Bennett v. Behring Corp., 96 F.R.D. 343, 353
(S.D. Fla. 1982)(rejecting objections that were raised because the notice had
failed to inform the class that one of the three named plaintiffs opposed the
settlement).
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concerning the case.205 Furthermore, such information is not neces-
sarily available in the court files. For example, in the combined certi-
fication-settlement cases in the Northern District of California study,
counsel did not bother to identify the representative's claims.2 0 6
Adequacy of representation in settlement negotiation should be a
key issue at the settlement hearing.20 7 Courts have the discretionary
power to require that class members be notified of an opportunity to
state whether they consider the representation to be fair and ade-
quate.208 Courts should make written determinations concerning ad-
equacy of representation, and the subsequent settlement agreement
should not extend beyond the class definition or the representative's
claims.
b. Objections by Representatives Are Not Disclosed
To avoid dissent, objections, or opt outs, class counsel generally do
not include in the notice that some or all of the named representatives
oppose the terms of the settlement agreement. Despite the fact that
the existence of such opposition is vital to an absent class member's
evaluation of her options, this information may not appear in the pub-
lic file. In the cases in the Northern District of California class action
study, there was no mention of any objections in the notices. 209
c. Plan of Distribution Is Not Revealed
The settlement agreement, notice, and hearing focus on the
amount of the settlement fund and related terms. The plan of distri-
bution provides the scheme and details on how and to whom the set-
tlement fund will be paid. Class counsel might not reveal the
distribution details until the day of the settlement hearing or even
later because such details may disclose preferences or other disparate
treatment of class members which could give rise to conflicts of inter-
est and might impede or delay settlement approval. Such distribution
information is crucial to class members' decisions whether to object or
205. Hiring an attorney for this purpose would substantially reduce or even exceed the
net value of the claim.
206. See infra appendix A, chart C.
207. The language and holdings in a number of cases so indicate. See WRmHT ET AL.,
supra note 24, § 1797.1 n.27. See also Plummer v. Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d 654
(2d Cir. 1982)(holding that in reviewing settlement, the district court must re-
view adequacy of representation of the entire class); National Super Spuds v.
New York Mercantile Exch., 660 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1981)(holding trial court not war-
ranted in approving settlement).
208. See Plummer v. Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1982).
209. See infra appendix A.
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to opt out, yet various courts have upheld the denial of access to this
information.210
In summary, the class member who receives the currently accepted
form of settlement notice is provided no information in the notice or in
the record on the merits as to adequacy of representation, the position
of the named representatives, the course of settlement negotiations,
the details of attorneys' fees, or the method or amount of settlement
distribution. Such notices should be deemed unreasonable and a de-
nial of due process.
6. Lack of Judicial Supervision
a. Settlement Negotiations
The duty of the court to review class settlements derives from the
potential for abuse and conflict between counsel and the class.211
Under the current settlement procedure, courts generally do not have
access to information that may be essential for purposes of evaluating
fairness, such as the options that were considered and rejected in set-
tlement negotiations, the issues that were discussed, the class oppo-
nent's reactions to various proposals, and the amount of compromise
necessary to obtain resolution through settlement.21 2 All of these
matters are within the proper scope of the judiciary's duty to evaluate
a proposed settlement prior to granting approval. However, courts
neither participate in settlement negotiations nor require information
concerning such negotiations under the rationale that settlements are
private contracts which cannot be forced by a court. Yet, the require-
ments of due process and Rule 23(e) mandate judicial review of class
action settlements for fairness and adequacy of representation.
The court's duty to review settlements should include participation
or at least familiarization with the negotiation process by the court or
by an appointed master, thereby ensuring that all compromises will be
fully revealed to the court, including all conflicts, claims, issues, and
remedies. This type of inquiry, however, has been rejected in recent
decisions,21 3 although the court's power to disapprove or suggest addi-
tional terms or changes necessary to gain approval justifies such in-
210. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 170 (2d Cir. 1987)(stating
there is no requirement that a distribution plan be formulated prior to settlement
notice); In re Cement and Concrete Antitrust Litig., 817 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir.
1987); Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 165 n.22 (S.D. Ohio 1992)(distribu-
tion plan not necessary in evaluating fairness of the settlement).
211. See Mars Steel v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust, 834 F.2d 677, 681-82 (7th
Cir. 1987); In re General Motors Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1125
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
212. In re General Motors Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1125 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
213. See Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
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quiry.2 14 In the Northern District of California study, no court made
detailed examinations of settlement negotiations, and none of the pro-
posed settlements were modified or invalidated.215
b. Attorneys' Fees
In jurisdictions which award attorneys' fees using a benchmark
percentage of thirty percent of the total recovery, the attorneys do not
provide details as to how many hours were spent or how they were
spent; a mere conclusory affidavit by class counsel as to their own
competency is deemed sufficient. Hence, the fact that class attorneys
are reaping several thousand dollars per hour remains undisclosed.
The Northern District of California class action study revealed that
the majority of suits had no supporting evidence .to justify the re-
quested percentage fee.216
In those jurisdictions which apply a lodestar or hourly analysis for
the award of attorneys' fees, more details are required as compared
with the benchmark jurisdiction practices, but the petitions artfully
avoid descriptions of attorney activity which may reveal overstaffing
or redundant or irrelevant tasks designed to increase hours.
Finally, in nearly all jurisdictions fee sharing between class coun-
sel and other counsel is neither disclosed nor the subject of judicial
inquiry. Fee sharing not only violates the rationale of attorneys' fees
based on hourly effort, it eliminates competition among potential class
counsel and avoids embarrassing questions about dissent or incompe-
tency. None of the cases in the Northern District of California study
required disclosures of any existing fee-sharing agreements. 21 7
7. The Settlement Hearing
Even if objections to adequacy of representation are made at the
settlement hearing, in most instances such objections are overruled
without evidentiary examination as to what occurred in the negotiat-
ing process. 218 The mere fact of objection, even by all or a majority of
the named representatives, will not necessarily bar judicial approval
214. Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 524 (1st Cir. 1991)("It is
because of the potential risk that plaintiff's attorneys and defendants will team
up to further parochial interests at the expense of the class that the Rule 23(e)
protocol employed by several circuits explicitly includes scrutinizing settlements
for indicia of collusion.").
215. See infra appendix A.
216. See infra appendix A.
217. See infra appendix A.
218. See, e.g., Boyd v. Bechtel, 485 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1979). In a few circuits, the
trial court must prepare reasoned responses to any objections, including findings
of fact. See Sanders v. Naval Air Rework Facilities, 608 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir.
1979); Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prod., Inc., 541 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1976).
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of the settlement.219 In In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litiga-
tion,220 the court, while acknowledging divergent interests were not
adequately represented, nonetheless upheld the settlement as fair
under an abuse of discretion standard.221
The problem is that groups with divergent interests may not be
properly represented during settlement negotiations, and when
presented with a fait accompli at the settlement hearing, they have
little or no chance of overturning the settlement agreement. 222 Even
if the overall settlement is fair in terms of total amount or relief se-
cured, details concerning distribution of funds or injunctive remedies
may differ among divergent class interests. Without being adequately
represented in the negotiating process, potential subclasses with dis-
senting interests will most likely view the general plan of distribution
as unfair.223
Some courts place a heavy burden of proof on the objectors to
demonstrate that the decree is unreasonable;224 others attach an ini-
tial presumption of fairness to the settlement upon recommendation of
class counsel.225 Under either burden, the objector must submit evi-
dence to show that the settlement is unfair, which may be difficult if
dissent has not been explored and the objector is provided with only a
limited or non-existent record on the merits.
219. See Bennett v. Behring Corp., 96 F.R.D. 343 (S.D. Fla. 1982). See also In re Cor-
rugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195,224 (5th Cir. 1981)(holding that
failure to require information that some of the representatives believed the set-
tlement to be inadequate was not an abuse of discretion).
220. 643 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1981).
221. Id. Cf Marshall v. Holiday Magic, 550 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1977)(resolving
claim of inadequate representation and conflict of interest by providing opportu-
nity to opt out of the settlement).
222. See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980); Reynolds v.
NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978)(upholding settlement based on overall review
of fairness, notwithstanding distinct conflicts of interest between subclasses of
retired and active members of the NFL).
223. The list of factors to be considered in settlement approval in most federal courts
does not explicitly include adequacy of representation. The following list of fac-
tors has been developed by the courts to determine whether a proposed settle-
ment is fair, adequate, and reasonable: (1) the strength of plaintiff's case and the
likelihood of success on the merits, as balanced against the amount of the pro-
posed settlement versus the amount sought via litigation; (2) any evidence of col-
lusion between named parties and class counsel; (3) reactions of the class to
settlement, based on silent ratification, absence of objections, or a majority of
favorable communications; (4) the opinions of class counsel; and (5) the stage of
proceedings and the amount of discovery completed. MooRE Er AL., supra note
24, § 23.80(u).
224. See United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 581 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501
U.S. 1250 (1991).
225. See White v. Morris, 811 F. Supp. 341 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
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In a few cases, the court has engaged in a careful analysis of all
aspects of the settlement, including adequacy of representation. 2 26
The Seventh Circuit originally held that objectors must be allowed
reasonable discovery on the conduct of negotiations and adequacy of
representation.2 2 7 In subsequent cases, however, the Seventh Circuit
has refused discovery absent a showing of collusion.228
Most settlement hearings are cheerleading sessions in which class
counsel and class opponents present the court with minimal informa-
tion, and judicial approval is routine. To add insult to injury, the class
member who decides not to stand in front of this steamroller toward
resolution of the case is treated by some courts as ratifying the settle-
ment by virtue of his failure to object.229
8. Permitting Opt Out Does Not Cure All Defects
Giving class members the opportunity to opt out is not a reason-
able substitute for the protection of class interests, which has been
steadily eroded by virtue of existing defects in settlement procedures.
The unfairness to class members is manifest, and applying any con-
cept of informed consent for failure to opt out of such proceedings is
highly questionable.
Often, the absent class members are not provided sufficient infor-
mation to formulate a rational decision on whether to opt out or to
remain bound by the terms of settlement. Where key information
bearing on the case-such as intra-class dissent, preferences, conflicts
of remedies, or opposition to settlement by the named representa-
tive-has been withheld, the absent member is operating on errone-
ous assumptions in making a decision as to claims that may be
inadequately compensated or permanently lost.
In deciding not to opt out, particularly in combined certification
settlements, class members may assume that representation is ade-
quate, even though the named representative may not even have par-
ticipated in the settlement process and adequacy was never reviewed
or determined by the court. Although courts are generally unfamiliar
with settlement negotiations, class members reasonably assume that
judicial supervision will protect their interests. Class members would
not be aware that in settlement hearings the court is often a captive
226. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & So. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 739 (2d Cir.
1992)(rejecting settlement and concluding that conflict was overwhelming in in-
cluding health claimants and codefendant manufacturers in a single class); In re
Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
227. In re General Mdtors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1124 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
228. See Mars Steel v. Continental Ill. Nat"I Bank & Trust, 834 F.2d 677, 681-82 (7th
Cir. 1987); Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
229. See discussion infra Part VIII.
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audience to a non-adversarial proceeding in which the parties with the
monopoly of information-class counsel and class opponents who have
engineered the settlement-are pursuing interests that may be con-
trary to those of the class. 2 30 Furthermore, in most settled cases there
is little or no record on the merits to enable any independent evalua-
tion of fairness.
The best solution for settlement defects is imposition of a higher
level of judicial supervision, with increased emphasis on adequacy of
representation issues and better communication of vital information
to class members. Courts should be clearly authorized and en-
couraged to use magistrate judges or special masters to increase the
degree of judicial oversight during all stages of the settlement process.
VII. APPELLATE REVIEW
Litigants seeking appellate review of rulings in class actions face
substantial barriers both in time of appeal and in the standard of
review.
A. Interlocutory Review of Class Action Orders
In general, class actions are subject to the final judgment rule, 28
U.S.C. § 1291. Any order which is not a final judgment is interlocu-
tory and not immediately appealable in order to prevent "the debilitat-
ing effect on judicial administration caused by piecemeal appeal
disposition of what is, in practical consequence, but a single
controversy. 231
Under the final judgment rule, the following class action orders are
interlocutory and not immediately appealable: orders granting or de-
nying certification,232 orders granting or denying intervention as class
representatives, 233 and orders granting or denying motions to disqual-
230. The court also exercises little control over attorneys' fees. See discussion supra
section IV.D.
231. Coopers and Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 471 (1978).
232. Id. at 470. But see Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 994 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1993)(re-
versing a denial of class certification on interlocutory appeal).
In the Second Circuit, the court in Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 176 (2nd Cir. 1990), held that a
denial of class certification was reviewable when the class representative's subse-
quent failure to prosecute its individual claims creates a final judgment. The
denial of certification was deemed to have merged into the final judgment which
resulted from the class representative's failure to prosecute. Id. at 179.
233. In Carlough v. Amchem Products, 5 F.3d 707 (3rd Cir. 1993), members of the
class appealed the denial of their motion to intervene as class representatives. In
denying their motion, the district court had assured the members that they would
nevertheless be able to participate as objectors to the settlement agreement. The
appellate court held that the members could not appeal, because "anyone who is
involved in an action sufficiently to have a right of appeal from its final disposi-
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ify the class attorney.23 4 Once a final judgment is entered after trial
or settlement, such orders may be reviewed as part of the appeal from
the judgment.
There are exceptions to the final judgment rule which may permit
interlocutory review in special situations. Orders granting or denying
preliminary injunctions are immediately appealable in accordance
with 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a), and class certification rulings that are inte-
gral to the injunction decision may be reviewed with the injunction
ruling.235 The courts of appeals have the discretionary power to issue
writs of mandamus in "extraordinary" cases but this power is rarely
exercised in the class action context.2 36
Class action certification rulings involve some factual analysis and
thus do not qualify as "a controlling question of law as to which there
is substantial ground for difference of opinion [when]... an immedi-
ate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation"23 7 under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). In short, there is little likeli-
hood of immediate review of class action rulings even though such rul-
ings may be crucial and controlling in the future conduct of the case.
B. The Standard of Review
Once final judgment is entered after trial or settlement of a class
action, there is a right to appeal by objectors or verdict losers. In the
overwhelming number of class actions the judgment is routinely af-
firmed under the abuse of discretion standard,238 although in a lim-
tion does not have an immediate right of appeal from a denial ... of interven-
tion." Id. at 712.
234. Council 31 v. Ward, 978 F.2d 373, 380 (7th Cir. 1992); Arney v. Finney, 967 F.2d
418, 422 (10th Cir. 1992).
235. See Gay v. Waiters and Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 549 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1977);
Inmates of San Diego County Jail in Cell Block 3B v. Duffy, 528 F.2d 954, 957
(9th Cir. 1975).
236. See In re Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C., 973 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1992)(holding
that the writ will not issue unless the district court's abuse of discretion in deny-
ing certification amounted to a usurpation of judicial power); Anschul v. Sitmar
Cruises, Inc., 544 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 907 (1976); In-
terpace Corp. v. Philadelphia, 438 F.2d 401 (3rd Cir. 1971).
237. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978).
238. See, e.g., Mayfield v. Barr, 985 F.2d 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1993)(affirming the trial
court's approval of a settlement agreement which dismissed the claims of the
class but preserved the individual claims of the named representative); Binker v.
Pennsylvania, 977 F.2d 604 (3rd Cir. 1992); Navarro-Ayala v. Hernandez-Colon,
951 F.2d 1325 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576 (9th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1250 (1991); Van Horn v. Trickey, 840 F.2d 604 (8th
Cir. 1988); Mars Steel v. Continental Ill. Natl Bank and Trust, 834 F.2d. 677 (7th
Cir. 1987); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987)(re-
viewing settlement and notice under abuse of discretion standard); In re Cement
and Concrete Antitrust Litig., 817 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1987); Clark Equip. v. In-
ternational Union Allied Indus. Workers, 803 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1986); Jones v.
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ited number of cases the appellate courts have applied an error of law
standard to various class action rulings.23 9 On appeal, the error of
law standard should be applied to protect the potential due process
rights of absent class members, including adequacy of representation
(identity of claims), conflicts of interest, the right to notice enabling
appearance or opt out, and the content and manner of notice.
These rulings do not entail disputed fact issues, determinations of
credibility, or other evaluation of evidence. Identity of claims requires
a comparison of the claims alleged by representatives with class
claims and the application of a legal standard of adequacy and typical-
ity. It should be classified as an issue of law and reviewed accordingly.
Similarly, conflicts of interest involve, in most instances, undisputed
facts of claims, issues, remedies, and the application of a law standard
to such facts. In such cases, error of law is the proper basis of review.
Categorization with the attendant right to notice also concerns legal
standards applied to given facts with the content and manner of notice
encompassing the established facts applied to the legal requirement.
All of these decisions relate to constitutional due process rights, thus,
heightened review under an error of law standard is appropriate. 240
Approval of settlement does require factual evaluations, and the
abuse of discretion standard is appropriate unless due process
problems exist. However, in most cases the all-inclusive use of the
abuse of discretion standard operates to deprive the absent class
member of his constitutional rights.
Nuclear Pharmacy, Inc., 741 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1983); Plummer v. Chemical Bank,
668 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d
195 (5th Cir. 1981)(upholding content of class notice under discretionary stan-
dard). But see, e.g., Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144 (11th Cir.
1983)(reversing under an abuse of discretion standard).
239. See, e.g., In re Joint E and So. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir.
1992)(reviewing de novo a violation of typicality and adequacy of representation);
Silber v. Mabon, 957 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1992)(reviewing notice procedures as er-
ror of law); Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144 (11th Cir. 1983) (hold-
ing abuse of discretion in refusing opt out); In re General Motors Engine
Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir.)(defining class, adequacy of represen-
tation and conflict of interest), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979); Green v. Occi-
dental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1976)(treating categorization
and notice as error of law).
240. See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980); Reynolds v.
NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978)(upholding settlement based on overall review
of fairness, notwithstanding distinct conflicts of interest between subclasses of
retired and active members of the NFL).
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XIII. RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ATTACK
A. Finality of Judgments and Settlements
Res judicata is the doctrine of finality, designed to put an end to
litigation of the same claims and issues.241 The rule is well settled
that a claim, once litigated between parties, is barred from further
adjudication between those same parties.242 Ajudgment extinguishes
all rights of the plaintiff as to remedies against the defendant with
respect to all or part of the same transaction, or series of connected
transactions from which the action arose.243 Claim is defined broadly
under res judicata principles,244 which creates judicial economy by
permitting a matter to be litigated only once.
In class actions, the members of the class are bound by the court's
decision in the same way that res judicata binds individual claim-
ants.245 A claim that has been or might have been brought, once de-
cided, is binding on all members of the class.246 The court is required
to define the class and to ascertain and list who may be bound by the
judgment.247
A broad definition of "claim" creates an incentive for settlement by
ensuring certainty and finality. Defendants seek a bill of peace, a uni-
versal release, and res judicata protection from all plaintiffs and pro-
241. Res judicata as used herein means either claim preclusion (traditional merger
and bar) or issue preclusion (traditional collateral estoppel). Claim preclusion
(merger) applies to a plaintiff who wins a final and valid judgment in the first
action, such that he cannot relitigate any part of that claim against the defend-
ant. Res judicata precludes not only further litigation on that particular claim
but also any other claims that might have been brought. This doctrine also ap-
plies to defendants in that they cannot later assert defenses that might have been
brought in the initial action. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGeMENTS § 18
(1982). Claim preclusion (bar) also applies to victorious defendants to prevent
further litigation arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. Any defenses
or claims that were or might have been brought in the first action merge with the
first final judgment and cannot be brought later. Id. § 19.
242. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981); Cromwell v.
County of Sac., 94 U.S. 351 (1876); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 17(3)(1982).
243. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982).
244. Claim is defined as the same transaction or occurrence. Transaction, in turn, is
determined by factors such as "time, space, origin, or motivation, [and] whether
they form a convenient trial unit." Id.
245. Section 41(e) of the Restatement of Judgments states:
A person who is not a party to an action but who is represented by a
party is bound by and entitled to the benefits of a judgment as though he
were a party. A person is represented by a party who is... representa-
tive of a class of persons similarly situated, designated as such with the
approval of the court, of which the person is a member.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41(e)(1982)
246. See Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 691 (1961).
247. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(3); TBK Partners, Ltd. v. Western Union Corp., 675 F.2d
456, 461 (2d Cir. 1982).
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spective plaintiffs by agreeing to completely dispose of a matter.
Without broad and all inclusive res judicata, a defendant may be un-
willing to settle.
Claim preclusion covers all matters which were or could have been
litigated in a prior class proceeding.248 Hence, the plaintiff class is
prohibited from splitting claims.2 49 Claim preclusion prevents alter-
nate legal theories or relief, and any alternate remedies are merged in
the final judgment.25 0 Thus, under res judicata principles, a class ob-
taining judgment for injunctive relief loses all rights to damages as
well. Res judicata requires a litigant to raise all interconnected claims
and remedies in one suit. The doctrine puts all claimants on notice of
its harsh effects 251 and promotes the policies of judicial efficiency and
encouragement of settlements.
B. Permissible Attack on Class Judgments and Settlements
for Lack of Due Process
In tension with the doctrines promoting finality is the requirement
that a judgment be valid. This tension raises two subsidiary ques-
tions: (1) whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction, and (2)
whether the due process rights of the parties were observed.
Due process requires jurisdiction over the person, plus notice and
opportunity to be heard under Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust.2 52
In the class action context, due process may be satisfied by class repre-
sentatives who "fairly and adequately represent 2 53 the absent class
members, or by notice to the class giving appearance or opt-out
rights.254 Due process by way of adequate representation is so crucial
in class actions that collateral attacks, as well as direct attacks by way
248. See, e.g., Bedgood v. Cleland, 554 F. Supp. 513 (D.C. Minn. 1982)(holding as res
judicata prior class action challenging notice and hearing procedures used by Vet-
erans Administration as to pension benefits, and barring instant action even
though additional or differing relief requested in later suit); Environmental De-
fense Fund v. Alexander, 501 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Miss. 1980)(holding that earlier
class action brought to enjoin continued construction of a waterway project which
the class lost barred subsequent complaint of insufficient studies and cost-benefit
analyses). See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 24, § 1789.
249. To illustrate, if the class proceeds on one legal theory relating to a claim and
loses, neither the class nor its individual members may later sue on the same
claim using a different legal theory. If the plaintiff class obtains a judgment of
$1,000,000, neither the class nor its individual members may later sue for more
money on the same claim.
250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 24-25 (1982).
251. See Matthews v. New York Racing Ass'n, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
Edward W. Cleary, Res Judicata Re-examined, 57 YALE L.J. 339, 340 (1948).
252. 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
253. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1946).
254. Due process also protects against arbitrary choice of law decisions and against
extrinsic fraud, such as bribery of a judge, which has precluded the opportunity
to be heard. See Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 819 (1985).
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of appeal and Rule 60 motions, are authorized. The absent class mem-
ber who commences a new lawsuit in another court and is confronted
with alleged claim preclusion from a class action settlement or trial
judgment may attack the validity of that judgment on due process
grounds.255 Failure to certify a class negates the binding effect of
judgment on absent members.256 In addition, a representative who is
incompetent or who serves her self-interests at the expense of the
class, creates a judgment that may be subject to collateral attack even
after certification. 257
When the validity of a trial or settlement judgment in the initial
class action is challenged in a second lawsuit, collateral attack neces-
sarily involves a two-stage examination: (1) the original court must
frame the judgment, including its extent or coverage; 258 and (2) the
preclusive effect of the judgment must be tested in the subsequent liti-
255. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1946)(establishing that inadequate repre-
sentation by reason of conflict of interest between representative and the class
renders class judgment void and subject to collateral attack for denial of due pro-
cess); Airlines Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines,
Inc., 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973)(finding inadequate representation and refusing
to enforce settlement where union class representative admitted that claims of
former employees were sacrificed for the benefit of present employees), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976); Fraternal Order of Police v. Brescher, 579 F. Supp.
1517 (S.D. Fla. 1984). But see Wren v. Sr~ith 41 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1969)(binding
absent class members without adequacy Pf representation analysis, even though
conflicting and antagonistic position included within scope of class claims).
256. See Jones v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 735 F.2d 923, 937 (5th Cir. 1984); Roman v.
ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343, 1356 (4th Cir. 1976); Jones-Bay v. Caso, 535 F.2d 1360
(2d Cir. 1976). Cf Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. NAACP, 714 F.2d 935, 943
(9th Cir. 1983); Robinson v. First Natl City Bank, 482 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y.
1979)(class not certified because formal certification procedures were not avail-
able to the trial court at time action was brought).
257. See Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 691 (1961)(Justice
Harlan noted that judgments in a class action bind only those members of the
class whose interests have been adequately represented by existing parties to the
litigation); Grigsby v. Northern Miss. Medical Ctr., Inc., 586 F.2d 457 (5th Cir.
1978)(remanding for reconsideration because representatives were not diligent in
performing their obligations and were focused more on their individual claims
than on the general claims of the class); Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th
Cir. 1973)(collateral attack on prior class judgment wherein named representa-
tive failed to appeal; relief granted was limited only to the named representative;
court held that class members were not bound by the failure to appeal and that
part of the judgment could not be res judicata as to the class for reason of inade-
quate representation)(citing M. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Con-
cerning Civil Rule 23,43 F.R.D. 39 (1967)). See also Crawford v. Honig, No. C-89-
0014, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13677, (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 1992)(declining to bar
action because the learning disabled were not adequately represented in previous
action to enjoin use of IQ tests for school placement); Lewis v. Phillip Morris, Inc.,
419 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Va. 1976)(permitting collateral attack because interests of
seasonal employees not satisfactorily advanced and litigated in first class action
involving claims of discrimination on behalf of all black employees).
258. See advisory committee note to the 1966 Amendment to FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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gation, since it cannot be pre-determined by the court adjudicating the
judgment.259 Further complicating this inquiry is the fact that
preclusive effect and due process are classified as issues of substantive
law which cannot be abridged, enlarged, or modified by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.260
Various circuits have relaxed the rules of res judicata or devised
special rules which are irrational and uncertain in scope. For exam-
ple, the Second Circuit bifurcated the claim preclusion rule in Gross-
man v. Axelrod,261 holding that the bar of claims which "could have
been brought" was inapplicable to civil rights class actions.262
Although intended to bring about a more fair result, applying a differ-
ent res judicata rule for civil rights cases violates the reasoning and
language of General Telephone v. Falcon,263 and creates barriers to
settlement. The Fifth Circuit, in Johnson v. General Motors Corp.,264
held that a prior 23(b)(2) class action for injunctive relief did not pre-
clude subsequent suits for monetary relief because the plaintiff had
not received notice, of the class action. 265 The court in Johnson also
held that the plaintiff was bound by the res judicata effect of the prior
(b)(2) action with respect to additional injunctive relief sought, even
though no notice had been given.266
Johnson and related cases 26 7 hold that adequacy of representation
alone does not satisfy due process in class actions involving dam-
ages-a proposition that is at variance with several hundred years of
class action law. Johnson also violates the basic res judicata principle
of merger 268 and creates confusion as to the relationship between the
requirements of adequate representation and notice.269
259. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 24, § 1789, at 245 n.16.
260. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988); WRIGHT Fr AL., supra note 24,
§ 1789, at 245 n.20.
261. 646 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1981).
262. Id. at 770.
263. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
264. 598 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1979).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992); Wright v. Collins,
766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1982)(citing
Norris v. Slothouber, 718 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1983)); Penson v. Terminal Transp.
Co., 634 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981); Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1979);
Jones-Bey v. Caso, 535 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir. 1976).
268. As related to class actions, the doctrine of merger requires that all alternative
forms of relief are encompassed in the class judgment.
269. It would make more sense to interpret Johnson as ruling that there was inade-
quate representation in the case with respect to the monetary claims.
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C. Collateral Attack for Lack of Due Process Denied
Adequate notice of a settlement hearing satisfies due process and
precludes collateral attack.270 If notice, adequate in content and man-
ner, is provided to the class 2 7 1 giving them an opportunity to appear
or to opt out, class members may not later claim lack of due pro-
cess. 2 72 Even if the settlement notice does not provide for opt out, due
process is nonetheless satisfied by the opportunity to object 2 73 and the
failure to object to settlement has been held to preclude any later con-
tentions of inadequacy of representation. 274
Since mere objections as to trial strategy are insufficient to show
lack of adequate representation, it may be difficult as a practical mat-
ter for the class member to challenge settlement on grounds of inade-
quate representation in another lawsuit.275 Given the impetus
toward settlement approval, it is also highly unlikely that an objector
would be able to succeed on appeal to overturn the settlement for lack
of adequate representation. 276
270. See Fowler v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1979)(holding that
retroactive priority given only to class representative does not create conflict of
interest because due process was satisfied in prior class settlement); Supermar-
kets Gen. Corp. v. Grinnell Corp., 490 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1974)(holding that
where reasonable notice is given, failure of individual or his counsel to receive
notice and to opt out did not negate class judgment).
271. Pursuant to FEn. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) or 23(e).
272. See Thompson v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 992 F.2d 187, 191 (8th Cir. 1993)(hold-
ing that settlement of prior securities class action is res judicata because inves-
tor, as member of the class, failed to opt out, object to terms of settlement
agreement, or seek relief under FEn. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b)); Peters v. National
R.R. Passenger Corp., 966 F.2d 1483, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1992)(rejecting inadequate
notice claim where notice not received due to error in mailing address).
273. See TBK Partners, Ltd. v. Western Union Corp. 675 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1982)(up-
holding settlement without opt out against a substantial number of objectors,
even as to appraisal claims which could not have been asserted in the class ac-
tion); Dosier v. Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp., 656 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir.
1981)(holding that class members represented by counsel in settlement hearing
are bound by the settlement).
274. See Laskey v. UAW, 638 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1981)(approving settlement without
opt out and ruling that failure to object was collateral estoppel on any later con-
tention as to adequacy of representation); White v. NFL, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1407
(D. Minn. 1993).
275. See, e.g., Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992).
276. See, e.g., Walsh v. Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co., 726 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1983)(ap-
proving settlement despite divergence of interest between former and current
employees in distribution of fund); Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir.
1978)(upholding approval of settlement under abuse of discretion standard; con-
flicts of interest between present and former football players did not require sub-
classification); Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114 (8th Cir.
1975)(upholding settlement approval under abuse of discretion standard,
notwithstanding the discrepancy in treatment of present and former franchisees).
Cf Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144 (11th Cir. 1983)(disapproving
settlement because inference of unfairness from disparate distribution to named
1994]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
In summary, over ninety percent of class actions are resolved by
settlement without much protection for the class beyond settlement
notice under Rule 23(e). Settlements receive appellate court approval
under an abuse of discretion standard following cursory review and
are virtually unassailable by collateral attack based on due process,
provided the settlement notice is adequate in content and manner of
service.
IX. CONCLUSION
The case for reform is clear. The substantial unfairness of class
action processes documented above have undercut public confidence
and trust. Studies on consumer responses to class actions have re-
vealed that the public believes recovery awards to be inadequate and
attorneys' compensation to be exorbitant. 27 7 These studies confirm
the desirability of modifying Rule 23.
plaitiffs was not rebutted); In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig.,
594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir.)(disapproving settlement in part because of conflict with
subclass), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
277. Gregory A. Falls and Debra Worden, Consumer Valuation of Protection From
Creditors Remedies, J. oF CONSUMER AFF., Summer 1988, at 20-37; Dan S. Van
Doren et al., The Effect of a Class Action Suit on Consumer Attitudes, J. OF PUB.
AFF. & MARKETING, Spring 1992, at 45.
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Y, APPENDIX A
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALmFoRNIA STUDY
The author studied the available records of all class action lawsuits
which had been filed and resolved in the Northern District of Califor-
nia from 1985 through 1993. These cases were condensed into thirty-
four fies by related case combinations or consolidations. The
predominate subject matter of these cases is shown in Chart A.
CHART A
PREDOMINATE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE LAwsuT As FILED
No.
Securities 21
Civil Rights 2
Contract 4
Constitutional-Statutory
Challenges to Gov't Action 5
Mass Torts 1
False Advertising 1
. CHART B
RESOLUTION OF AcTIONs
% (Not Including
Number of Voluntary
Consolidated Dismissals and
Class Suits Remands)
1. By settlement 24 83%
A. Certification and Settlement Separated
1. Certification by Stipulation 6 20.6%
2. Certification after Hearing. 6 20.6%
B. Certification and Settlement Combined 12 41.2%
2. Decision on Merits with Certification 1 3.4%
3. Decision on Merits without Certification
A. Summary Judgment 2 13.7%
B. Dismissals with Prejudice 2
(1) As shown by Chart B, 83% of these cases were resolved by set-
tlement. (2) The remaining cases were resolved by voluntary dismis-
sal or remand to state court. (3) Two-thirds of the settled lawsuits
were certified by stipulation or received tentative certification for set-
tlement purposes.
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CHART C
ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION
(FoR CASES WHCH WERE CERTIFIED)
Description of the claims, defenses, and issues averred by the rep-
resentative as compared to the class (cases certified as class actions
only).
Yes No
A. In the complaint. 24% 76%*
B. In the motion for certification. 19% 81%
C. At the certification hearing. 19% 81%
D. In the notice following certification giving appearance 100%
or opt-out rights.
E. In the motion for certification for settlement purposes 100%
and tentative approval of settlement (combined
certification and settlement).
F. In the notice of hearing for settlement approval. 100%
G. At the settlement approval hearing. 100%
An analysis of adequacy of representation (identity of claims) did
not occur at any time in over 75% of the decisions, as shown by Chart
C. (1) No discovery took place in 30% of the cases. There was minimal
discovery (a single request for documents) in 17% of the cases and sub-
stantial discovery in the remainder. (2) The named representatives
did not participate in settlement processes in any of the cases, nor was
there any discovery on the settlement negotiations. (3) In connection
with the settlement hearing, objections were filed (in addition to opt
outs) in 29% of the actions. Findings were filed in response to the ob-
jections in 42% of the cases in which objections were made.
Preferences to the named representatives occurred in four cases
(16%), and inequality in the plan of distribution appeared on the rec-
ord in five lawsuits (20.8%). There was no representative for those
receiving lesser treatment in any of the cases. The plan of distribution
did not appear in the settlement hearing notice or at the hearing in
ten cases (42%). The right to opt out from the settlement agreement
was granted in 70% of the cases.
Class attorneys received substantial awards (normally 25% to 30%
of the common fund) with little or no judicial scrutiny, as shown by
Chart D.
Merely asserting that the representative is a stock purchaser is not sufficient. In
securities cases, the representatives and the class must be injured by the same
misrepresentations or nondisclosures. Material disclosures create substantial
difference in the same representation and reliance aspects of claims. If pendent
state law claims are averred, individualized reliance and choice of law issues
become crucial and should be identified. See Downs, supra note 2, at 690-94.
Furthermore a number of the securities cases involve pyramid schemes or
multiple partnerships in which details of the representative's claim and
involvement are vital but were undisclosed in the complaint or thereafter.
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CHART D
Attorneys' Fees Yes No
Did attorneys receive what they requested? 100%
Did attorneys submit showing of number of hours expended? 24% 76%
Did attorneys submit detail on how hours were expended? 8% 92%
Method of Award:
Percentage of Recovery 76%
Lodestar or Balance of Factors 24%
